2nd Preliminary Issue

THEOLOGY Digest

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MAY, 1952

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A Word —

BEFORE YOU BEGIN

When the first experimental issue of THEOLOGY DIGEST was published last December, it was uncertain whether the reaction to the magazine would warrant its continuation. The response—from bishops, priests, religious, and seminarians, from teachers in seminaries and colleges, from Catholic college students and graduates—was most encouraging. There seems to be place for a magazine that will present in condensed form the leading articles from current theological journals.

On the basis of this response, it is hoped that we can begin regular publication with the beginning of 1953. In the meantime, this present experimental issue and another in October will furnish an opportunity to work out details in the magazine. These two issues will be circulated, as the first issue was, to a select group, so that we may benefit from their criticism and suggestions.

To those who took the time and trouble to send us criticisms of our December issue we are deeply indebted. These letters have been of real value in estimating the worth and appeal of various types of articles, in detecting weak points in our digest technique, and in calculating the extent of the support which this new magazine can expect. We are also very grateful to those who were so considerate as to send us financial help to assist us in the period of experimental publication—it is due to them that we have been able to have this issue printed commercially.

Taking advantage of the suggestions which our "critics" made, we are experimenting with several items this issue: there are some changes in format and type face and size; we have introduced a few abstracts and extended explanatory material; there has been a shift in the relative emphasis on different fields of theology. It is particularly with regard to these elements that we hope to receive further suggestions and criticisms.

We realize that time is a precious item to those who will receive this issue. Yet we hope that many will be able to send us, at least in brief form, their reaction. We would like to know: What do you consider good points or weak points in this issue? Which articles appealed to you and which did not? What changes would you suggest to make the magazine more valuable or more attractive?

Just as the encyclical *Humani Generis* was a focal topic in our first issue, so also there is a central theme which runs through the present number: the application of Christianity to the modern world and the role of theology in that application. Thus, our digests deal with the application of Christianity to social problems, with the revitalization of preaching and religious life and theology itself in the face of modern needs, with a theological interpretation of history, and with a more intelligent participation in social worship. Evolution, miracles, and the existence of a supernatural order are certainly vital questions today; and the role of the Blessed Virgin in our present-day world is becoming increasingly prominent. Even the two articles on Scripture deal with parallels to modern problems. If it accomplishes nothing else, this issue of THEOLOGY DIGEST should point to the importance of theology in the world today.

For our address and other publishing information, see page 48.

THE THEOLOGY OF *Preaching*

G. B. GUZZETTI

In 1936 the torch of controversy was set aflame in the Catholic theological world by the publication of a book by Fr. Josef A. Jungmann, S.J. The purpose of this book, Die Frohbotschaft und unsere Glaubensverkündigung, *was to point out the glaring deficiencies in our pastoral work of preaching and teaching the message of salvation to the faithful and to stress the need for a theology of preaching. Since nothing has appeared to date in English about this theological controversy and the problems which it has served to highlight, we have selected this article from* La Scuola Cattolica, *LXXVII (1950), pp. 260-282, which gives a history of the dispute. The author, Professor G. B. Guzzetti of the Archiepiscopal Seminary of Milan, is the editor of this review which is published at the seminary.*

In the past fifteen years there has been much discussion about the so-called "Theology of Preaching" or "Kerygmatic Theology." This new movement in theology which had its origin among theologians at Innsbruck (J. A. Jungmann, F. Lackner, H. and K. Rahner, Dander), took its start from an attentive evaluation of present-day Christianity. Undoubtedly there is much to be proud of in Christianity today—our zealous missionary effforts, youth organizations, works of charity—but there are also very disturbing shadows on the scene. Most alarming is the absence of Christians who really practice their faith. One has only to open his eyes to see the desecration of the family and corruption in political and economic life. Even among practicing Christians how many accept Christianity only as an unescapable and unenviable burden, following its precepts under the pressure of tradition or the fear of hell! The situation, indeed, is far from ideal.

Causes of the Shadows

Beside the drag of fallen human nature, the bad influences of irreligious environment, and the treacherous infiltration of evil on all sides, there are, according to the kerygmatics, special causes at work: namely, an insufficient knowledge and defective presentation of Christian revelation stemming from insufficiencies in our theology itself.

The defect in content of knowledge among Catholics is not so distressing as their lack of persuasion that Christianity is of vital importance in their lives. Many can recite without a mistake the creed or the commandments, but they are unaware of the impact these truths should have on life. To them Christianity is true in the same sense that Mt. Blanc is 15,781 feet high—it might just as well be thirty feet higher.

This state of affairs may be due to many causes, but the reason emphasized by the kerygmatics is a serious defectiveness in our preaching and, in general, faulty pastoral procedure. This is typified, for example, by our catechisms. They are nothing but a tidy compendium of theological textbooks, and have the same didactic spirit and preoccupations.

The more fundamental reason for this state of affairs is found by the kerygmatics in our present-day theology. Scholastic theology is too much shut up within the circle of its own concepts and theses, too preoccupied with the concatenation of thought and with defense against adversaries. Witness the time devoted to questions like the controversy on divine *concursus,* the concept of relation, the mode of Eucharistic presence. How little time, on the other hand, is given to the sublime significance of the Incarnation

and the Eucharist in the life of a Christian!

The kerygmatics are far from denying or belittling the importance of scientific theology. But our theology seems to have hardened into a dry set of impeccable formulas in which nothing is missing except life. The enormous development of particular points of doctrine and the great advance in polemics are good things, to be sure, say the kerygmatics, but on condition that the points important for Christian living have had an equal development and that the sword is put back into the scabbard when the enemy is vanquished. This, sad to say, has not been the case.

Remedies

What must be given to the faithful, according to the kerygmatics, is not a more ample knowledge of their faith, but a new outlook on Christianity: the idea and the conviction that Christianity alone is the true way of life; that being a member of the Church is one of the greatest of God's gifts; that those outside the Church should have our sympathy, since they are deprived of the fullness of light and grace which we enjoy.

To accomplish this end, our preaching must once again become the tidings of great joy, the message of happiness and salvation: the joy of Christ born, put to death, and risen for us, and the blessed delight of knowing and freely following our Father's will.

To the kerygmatics such a revitalized preaching demands a "re-thinking-through" of revelation and a rebuilding of present-day theology into a theology fitted to preaching and instruction. Hence, they say, it is necessary to construct alongside scientific theology another distinct theology, a theology of preaching which will prepare the pastor of souls for his work of preaching the Gospel.

In brief the reasoning of the kerygmatics is as follows:

1. The objectives of scientific theology are: to penetrate ever more deeply and to assimilate and systematize the whole content of revelation, and to defend it against attack. These objectives, however, do not provide for the exigencies of preaching and living, where the important thing is the glowing vision of Christianity as a way of life, a message of salvation, a wonderful gift of a loving Father. Hence another theology is necessary, a theology of preaching.

2. Scientific theology follows a logico-systematic order which is not suited to preaching and living. Its central object is God. It begins with a consideration of His essence (unity in trinity), then studies His operations (the procession of creatures from God through creation and their return to Him). The demands of preaching and living require another order of presentation, a psychologico-historical order, in which the central figure is Christ, studied in His historical background, His life, His work, His Church. Hence the need of a new theology to satisfy these demands.

3. Scientific theology makes use of a highly technical terminology in its pursuit of clarity and precision of thought. What is needed, however, for preaching and living is a simple, attractive vocabulary, aimed more at understanding and appreciation than at precision and completeness. Again the solution is a new theology.

4. Finally, in Tradition and in the early history of theology we find not only a certain content of revealed truth, but also a definite method of presenting it—precisely that method which aims at making Christianity appealing and acceptable, the historico-psychological method centered in the figure of Christ, an attractive narrative method which constitutes the framework of the new theology which the kerygmatics wish to set up.

The proposal of a kerygmatic theology has not been left in sterile outline. The kerygmatics themselves have written a number of books and articles to exemplify the way in which such a theology should be worked out. Dander's *Christus alles und in allen* presents the mystery of the God-man in a simple style, replete with the riches of Scripture, and free from scientific trappings. H. Rahner's book *Eine Theologie der Verkündigung* and several of his articles appearing in *Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie* during the years 1939-1941 present in kerygmatic fashion many of the mysteries of Christianity.

Reaction to the Kerygmatic Theory

The Catholic theological world showed general agreement with the kerygmatics on the point that Christian thought is sorely in need of revitalization and that our present-day theology as well as our preaching leaves much to be desired in effecting enthusiastic response to the Gospel message. However, a vigorous stand was taken, particularly in the German speaking world, against the need for a new theology distinct from and independent of scientific theology. Indeed, such a new theology is neither necessary nor does it make sense, because theology of its nature is at one and the same time both scientific and kerygmatic in character. Overemphasis of either aspect is equally wrong. While too much insistence on syllogistic reasoning and organization of theses kills the spirit, yet departure from rigorous procedure, documentation, and refutation of adversaries would be dangerously pragmatic. Moreover, a kerygmatic theology separate from scientific theology would tend to become subjective.

Then too, the directives of the Holy See regarding ecclesiastical studies are not favorable to such a radical change as that suggested by the kerygmatics.

To bridge the valley that lies between theology and Christian living the most that anyone would concede is the founding of a homiletic or pastoral science to investigate scientifically the various forms and methods by which the Christian message can be effectively presented to men of different times, places, and walks of life.

Nothing is more significant in the reaction of Catholic theologians than the example of Schmaus, who after protesting vigorously against an independent kerygmatic theology set out in his *Katholische Dogmatik* to provide a theological presentation of revelation which would correspond to the exigencies of preaching the Gospel.

Reply of the Kerygmatics

Father Jungmann replied that he is not at all dissatisfied with the results of the discussion. If the fruit of the whole controversy is an orientation of scientific theology to pastoral needs, making it a science of the message of salvation, there is no necessity for a separate kerygmatic theology, since the original objective will have been obtained. He insists, moreover, that it was never his personal intention to foster a new theology entirely independent of and opposed to scientific theology. That is a matter of secondary importance into which the discussion had deviated. The main problem is the elaboration of a set of proper rules for preaching the message of salvation.

The controversy today has reached a state of general agreement on the following points:

1. Today there exists a real kerygmatic problem which necessitates the study of revelation in function of preaching and living.

2. Theology such as it is generally found in theological manuals is not adequate to meet this problem.

3. Nevertheless, there is no necessity for constructing a new theology independent of scientific theology. What is needed is a further development of traditional theology to accommodate it to all the exigencies of pastoral work.

4. Thus the tasks ahead for the theologian are vast and arduous.

"The Sacred Books were not given by God to men to satisfy their curiosity or to provide them with material for study and research, but, as the Apostle observes, in order that these Divine Oracles might 'instruct us to salvation, by the faith which is in Christ Jesus' and 'that the man of God may be perfect, furnished to every good work.'" Pius XII, *Divino Afflante Spiritu.*

PRESENT TRENDS in the Religious Life

IGNACIO IPARRAGUIRRE, S. J.

At the time of the world-wide Congress of Religious held in Rome toward the end of 1950 there were rumors that drastic changes were being planned in the structure of religious societies. The report on the Congress by Father Iparraguirre which is digested here does not mention such drastic changes. But he does point to the widespread sentiment among religious themselves that the religious life must be fitted to the modern world—by adaptations of some accidentals but more so by an intensification of the religious spirit. This article is taken from Manresa, *XXIII (1951), pp. 41-74. The author teaches ecclesiastical history at the Colegio Maximo de San Francisco Javier, Ona, Spain. He has written extensively on the spirituality of St. Ignatius Loyola.*

The Congress on the States of Perfection held at Rome at the end of the Holy Year of 1950 was an excellent vantage point from which to observe and evaluate the trends alive at the present time among members of the states of perfection. We shall be concerned here with a general view of the most important of these trends. We shall, however, limit our survey to religious and to topics more directly connected with spirituality.

Desire for Adaptation

All who attended the Congress came convinced of the necessity of improving the efficiency of many techniques and organizations. This desire for adaptation has existed in the societies of religious all through their history and indicates the strength of their interior life. But at some periods, as in ours, this desire has been felt more keenly. One of the most important steps in the crystalization of this attitude was the adaptation of the Constitutions of the societies of religious to the new Code of Canon Law. That adaptation was made primarily on the level of internal structure and bore fruit in the interior life. With the intensification of the interior life, the urge toward the apostolate grew in strength and brought with it a revitalized desire to improve apostolic techniques.

This movement is reflected in many documents and it finds its most important expression in Pius XII's discourse to the students and the alumni of the Pontifical Leonine College: "The Church, the Mystical Body of Christ, like the individuals who compose it, is a living organism, substantially always identical with itself; . . . but a living body grows, develops, tends to maturity. The Mystical Body of Christ, as the physical members which constitute it . . . always belongs to its period, advances with the same day by day, hour by hour, and continually adapts its way and behavior to the society in the midst of which it must function. . . ."

Father Lombardi is a second reliable witness to the vitality and the reality of this movement. "Religious institutes, if they would be faithful to the vocation and the spirit which was theirs at their birth into the Church—in short, just to remain the same without alteration—must constantly examine methods of accomplishing that vocation at every stage and of applying that spirit to new sets of circumstances. The day they do not achieve such a living adaptation and are satisfied with woodenly repeating what preceding generations have

done, that day they would give obvious proof of decrepitude and would run the risk of becoming exhausted, even dying, from lack of nourishment. Making this delicate adjustment requires at one and the same time a holy boldness and a loyalty to traditions."

To this urge toward adaptation, the sound directive of Father Garrigou-Lagrange gives a secure orientation: "This renovation, more than new legislation, needs new men, interior and holy men, who are filled with the spirit of their founder and can transmit the same to succeeding generations."

Value of Religious State Confirmed

Father Lombardi, whose opinion has special weight because of his exceptional contact with many of the common people, gave a penetrating analysis of the value the religious state has today. In substance, he argues thus: People have lost their faith in everything human; but they still retain their faith in Christ, for Christ alone has not deceived them. If they see someone mirroring Christ in his speech and his actions, they have confidence in that person. Now, the religious has broken his ties with the world to follow Christ. As far as human nature allows, it is he who can be less a mere man and more like Christ. As a result, the world has confidence in the religious if the religious is what he ought to be. In all probability the religious life has greater influence today than ever before.

A layman, Mr. Lazarini, echoed the opinion of Father Lombardi. Today more than ever, he said, we need religious—austere religious whose dress and bearing bespeak their detachment from the world.

Cardinal Piazza in his evaluation of the foundations of the religious state arrived at a similar conclusion. The religious state, established in its very essence by Christ Himself, is, to use Suarez' expression, *de iure divino non praecipiente sed consulente.* The fact that it is grafted onto the Mystical Body of Christ by the approbation of legitimate ecclesiastical authority gives official assurance that it enjoys a vital communication with the Mystical Body. Such an act of incorporation secures for the religious state its participation in the sanctity of the Mystical Body and guarantees it a lasting role within its functional sphere.

Pope Pius XII has confirmed this truth of the present intrinsic value of the religious state by his strong insistence that today as always abnegation is one of the chief means whereby religious life is nourished: "Abnegation of self for the love of God must be regarded as the only path to perfection. Do not forget that the only sure sign of real spirituality is self-denial, self-conquest, . . . a spirit of abnegation that remains unsatisfied until interior and exterior suffering have taxed its powers to the limit."

The sense of security displayed by the Congress in the enduring soundness of the religious state proved to be highly beneficial; for some, influenced by antireligious propaganda, had allowed themselves to feel misgivings as to the value of their chosen profession. To such as these—and to all—the unexpected conclusion arrived at after a sincere and quiet examination of merits and deficiencies brought deep satisfaction, perhaps put an end to interior disquiet, and certainly gave a strong, new impulse to continue in the path to which God had called them.

How Achieve This Renovation?

Several lengthy discussions were given over to an analysis of this important problem: Our profession and practice of the religious state is not succeeding in bringing back the world to Christ, and our apostolate does not reach many abandoned areas. It is necessary at all costs to increase both the effectiveness and the extent of our activity and, consequently, to avail ourselves of the resources contained in the methods of propaganda in use today. But, how are we to achieve the fusion of what is modern with what is essential and traditional in the religious life? Obviously, this renovation cannot be effected simply by an external superposition of foreign elements onto the pure tradition, that is, onto the complex of customs and principles which have gradually developed into the peculiar patrimony of each institute. If at some time a new element must be introduced, this new element, like any

grafting, must have enough affinity to the old to make it capable of being implanted and assimilated. For this reason Father Garrigou-Lagrange objected to the suitability of the words "adaptation" and "accommodation." The right word to express the precise meaning here is "assimilation."

To meet the needs of present circumstances, the religious life must continually assimilate within its organism those wholesome elements present in its environment. There must be assimilation if the traditional spirit is to stay alive.

A practical conclusion can be drawn from the fact that there exists this harmony between sound tradition and the spirit of renovation. The best way to reform is to keep tradition vigorous. "Return to the pure fonts of the spirit in each institute" was the password of Cardinal Piazza. "Infunde nobis spiritum fundatorum nostrorum" was the daily prayer of those attending the Congress. Father Larroana, Secretary of the Congregation of Religious, summed up the findings of the Congress in these words: "Fidelity in the essential, renovation in the accidental."

Dangers for the Religious State

The danger arising from contact with the world can take many forms. It may consist in the cult of centralization which might very well destroy intimate family relationships; in the spirit of false democracy which poisons the spirit of obedience; in the bureaucracy which may convert the apostolate into a huge business enterprise; in the regularity of common life which can pass as a shield for comfort and irresponsibility. Besides, there is modern superficiality, excessive freedom of thought, the spirit of criticism, and an attitude of fear in the face of these dangers that may drive us to shut ourselves off from the world in order to flee from them.

The danger arising from contact with the world can best be met by giving religious a solid formation. There is no need to keep them away from the battle line. We must give them weapons and teach them how to wield them. A Swiss Capuchin, Father Solano de Zurich, presented an interesting study based on a questionnaire sent to religious in Switzerland, to show how the right kind of contact with the world can have beneficial effects in the spiritual training of religious.

Present Attitude Toward Apostolate

Religious have given up everything for souls; and if by their life they do not succeed in saving souls, their mission is a failure. For this reason the meaning of the apostolate received considerable attention. The apostolate exists to convey a message, to reveal Christ to souls. And much more than this, it ought to reproduce the life of Christ in the lives of individuals. It ought to be a testimonial, an example. The very wearing of the religious habit and the observance of the rules are marks of a witness.

Great emphasis was given to the apostolate of shaping thought. For a long time we have been influencing individuals but we have not been influencing ideas. On the whole it is ideas which move the masses and the enemies of the Church have succeeded in making their ideas dominant in the intellectual atmosphere. In this work the possibilities of the societies of religious are practically unlimited. Their organization into communities gives opportunities for collective effort and opens up a splendid field for this kind of apostolate.

The Church, for example, must not restrict her labors to hospitals, factories, and charitable institutions, but must dominate the battlefield of thought in social questions, must guide and channel philosophy, must shape the development of thought in all influential departments of society.

Obviously, space does not permit a detailed discussion of all the many ideas presented at the Congress. We shall limit ourselves, therefore, to a brief summary in outline form of the leading ideas.

Role of superiors: Superiors are the backbone of the religious life and their role is of critical importance. It is necessary for them to have a deep knowledge of their subjects, a knowledge to be gained through mutual union and an association as intimate as possible. An atmosphere of confidence is the one best suited to the fruitfulness

of true obedience. The superior should be a father, a confidant—without ceasing to be a superior.

Longer and deeper formation: Taking for granted that candidates have been carefully selected, it is further necessary to take great pains in their formation. In this connection Father Larraona announced that the Holy See would soon issue an instruction on the formation of religious, particularly from a cultural point of view. The chief trends mentioned were the extension of the years of formation, the postponement of the entrance age, and the addition of one year of immediate preparation for the apostolate at the end of the course, and another intermediate year of experience in the apostolate between philosophy and theology. Particularly interesting were proposed objectives such as the following: to prepare young religious for the reality in life by giving them contact with that same reality without disturbing their spiritual life; to give healthy attitudes to the unpleasant aspects of the religious life rather than to conceal them; to present the religious life in the novitiate objectively as it really exists; not to fear that the novices will be scandalized, but rather to fear that they will not get over a certain interior naïveté so dangerous for an apostle.

Religious spirituality: Just as there are specifically different types of spirituality proper to Carmelites, Jesuits, Benedictines, etc., so too there ought to be a spirituality for religious in general which includes and contains all the specifically different kinds of religious spirituality and likewise distinguishes them as a group from other kinds of spirituality, such as that of lay people, for example. Here, in my opinion, is an outline of the basic elements in this religious spirituality, such as they can be inferred from the mass of attitudes and ideas which appeared at the Congress: detachment, effective and affective, from the spirit and standards of the world and from everything temporal; perfect holocaust of oneself and one's possessions; intense desire for and complete dedication to the service of God; progressive spiritualization of one's interests and ideals, so that one finds God in all things; immersion in Christ; intimate union with God; diffusion of this internal divine fulness onto the world, souls, and society, repeatedly going up from self and the world to God in order to come down again to men in a continual uninterrupted rise and descent. In the last analysis, this comes down to living the vows, to making as effective as possible one's oblation and complete dedication of self to God.

Many other points were treated in the Congress, particularly matters pertaining to organization, the apostolate, juridical refinements, and legislation. However, in this study of ours, we have been less interested in presenting the concrete results of the Congress than in detecting trends and noting the standards and objectives which those trends indicate.

MARY'S COREDEMPTION

"Furthermore, the most holy Mother of God had not only the honor of 'having given the substance of her flesh to the Only-begotten Son of God, who was to be born of the human race,' and by means of this flesh the Victim for the salvation of men was to be prepared, but she was also entrusted with the task of tending and nourishing this Victim and even of offering it on the altar at the appointed time. . . . Then, when the last hour of the Son arrived, 'there stood by the Cross of Jesus His Mother,' not merely occupied in contemplating the cruel spectacle, but rejoicing that 'her Only-begotten was being offered for the salvation of the human race, and she suffered so much together with Him, that, if it had been possible, she would with greater willingness have borne all the torments that her Son suffered.' And by this community of pain and will between Christ and Mary 'she merited to become in a most worthy manner the Reparatrix of the lost world.'" Pius X, *Ad Diem Illum.*

MANUEL CUERVO, O. P.

Mary, MEDIATRIX OF GRACE

Few, if any, doctrines are the object of more theological thought and discussion at the present time than the mediation of the Blessed Virgin. Fr. Manuel Cuervo, O.P., Professor of Dogmatic Theology in the University of Salamanca, has been prominent among the Spanish writers on the subject. The article from which this digest is made was published in Ciencia Tomista, *237 (1950), pp. 457-477. Father Cuervo is here interested, not in the distribution of grace, but in the question of Mary's meriting of grace for men.*

The question suggested in the title of this article has two distinct parts: first, the foundations of Mary's mediation; second, its nature and extent.

The Foundations of Mary's Mediation

Divine revelation associates the Blessed Virgin inseparably with the Savior in the plan of the Incarnation. We know from divine revelation that the purpose of the Incarnation and everything connected with it is to secure for man the grace lost by sin. By affirming the inseparable union of the Blessed Virgin and Christ in the Incarnation, divine revelation also implicitly affirms their union in effecting our salvation by means of grace. Therefore, divine revelation can be said to affirm that Mary is subordinate mediatrix of grace between God and man, dependent on Christ, the principal Mediator.

We will not perfectly grasp this implicit affirmation of revelation if we try to particularize it in isolated testimonies of revelation. Rather we must consider revelation as a whole.

Tradition has considered revelation in this way. That is why it has placed the same antithesis between Mary and Eve as St. Paul established between Christ and Adam. Tradition considers Jesus and Mary as constituting an indivisible principle of our salvation though each in his own order and degree.

Beginning with Pius IX the Supreme Pontiffs have categorically taught Mary's mediation of grace. The doctrine has been confirmed by the institution of a feast honoring the Virgin under the title, Mediatrix of All Graces. This feast has been extended to the universal Church.

Theologically, the foundation of Mary's mediation is the divine maternity. This places her in an order between God and man. Thus she pertains in a relative manner to the hypostatic order of Christ. Since this hypostatic order is designed to gain grace for men, Mary is constituted mediatrix and dispenser of grace together with Christ and dependent on Him.

The Nature of Mary's Mediation

We come now to the theological question, as yet unsettled, about the precise nature of Mary's mediation of grace. In discussing it we prefer to use the terminology of St. Thomas. He distinguishes three kinds of mediation: dispositive, ministerial, and perfective (III, q. 26, a. 1).

Dispositive mediation has to do with bringing about the dispositions necessary for men's justification. Ministerial mediation is that exercised by priests either in the administration of the Sacraments or in the performance of jurisdictional functions. Perfective mediation goes much further than the other two. Its object is to acquire the grace necessary to justify and sanctify all men and, as a consequence, to distribute and communicate this grace to all men. We may note here that the distribution of this grace will have the same extension as its acquisition (cf. *Compendium Theologiae,* c. 241). Therefore, if we show

that Mary acquires grace for all men in union with Christ, we will also have shown that she distributes grace to all in union with Him.

Perfective mediation can be of two specifically different kinds: principal, which can belong only to Christ; secondary, which, absolutely speaking, could be exercised by other individuals of the human race.

According to this distinction what kind of mediation belongs to Mary? There are three positions in regard to this question. The first of these attributes to her a purely mediate mediation inasmuch as she is the Mother of Christ. It is based on the teaching of St. Paul that there is only one Mediator, the man Christ Jesus (I Tim. 2:5). According to the terminology of St. Thomas we would call this dispositive mediation.

This position is very unsatisfactory for several reasons. First, it fails to give Mary the role which Sacred Scripture and Tradition implicitly demand. The sources of revelation associate Jesus and Mary very closely in the divine plan of our salvation. This close association seems to require that Mary have a part not only in forming the body of the Savior but also in acquiring and distributing redemptive grace. Second, by reason of her divine maternity Mary belongs in a relative manner to the hypostatic order. Purely mediate mediation would deny her a part with Jesus in the purpose of this order, which purpose is the acquisition and distribution of redemptive grace. Finally, the position seems to contradict the testimonies of recent Roman Pontiffs, who openly affirm Mary's co-redemption, or what is the same, her cooperation with Christ in acquiring grace and in reconciling man with God.

The second position recognizes that purely mediate mediation minimizes Mary's participation in the redemption. Consequently, it asserts that she participates with Christ in acquiring redemptive grace congruously *(de congruo)*. Those who hold this position do so for two reasons. First, they do not wish to put Mary's meriting of redemptive grace on a plane with Christ's condign *(de condigno)* meriting of this grace. Second, they think that this position is taught by Pius X in his encylical, "Ad Diem Illum." According to the terminology of St. Thomas we would say that the second position attributes perfective mediation to Mary.

However, we do not think this to be the kind of mediation indicated by revelation and theology. First, because cooperation in objective redemption as well as in the distributing of grace through congruous meriting can be common to all men. Therefore, it could hardly befit the Mother of God, who is in an order above all men in virtue of her divine maternity. Second, to say that Mary's meriting of grace for all men is more than congruous meriting is not to put her meriting on a plane with Christ's. His meriting is condign in strict justice *(ex toto rigore justitiae)* and, therefore, essentially different from Mary's, which is condign according to a divinely determined proportion *(ex condignitate)*. Finally, Pius X did not authoritatively sanction the exactness of the term *de congruo* when he wrote that theologians call Mary's meriting for all men congruous *(de congruo ut aiunt)*. He wished to affirm that she did merit grace for us and says, in effect, that this meriting was at least congruous.

Our own position is that Mary's mediation is perfective, that her meriting of grace and satisfaction for men is condign *ex condignitate*. We think this view necessary to do full justice to her mediation and to square it with the other fundamental truths of Mariology.

Older theologians did not affirm Mary's mediation to be of this kind, but they showed the possibility of this kind of mediation. For they described the conditions necessary that a man whom God would put at the head of the human race might merit and satisfy condignly *ex condignitate* for the rest of men. In order that we may ascribe this kind of mediation to Mary, we must first demonstrate that these conditions are verified in her. These conditions can be reduced to three: abundant grace; moral representation of all mankind as its redeemer; divine orientation of the grace of this man to merit and satisfy for all. (Cf. St. Thomas, *Summa Theologica*, I, q. 64, a. 4; John of St. Thomas, In III, q. 1, dist. 1, a. 2, n. 72;

Gonet, *Tractatus de Justificatione et Merito,* disp. 2, a. 7, conclusio 3.)

The first condition, abundant grace, is without doubt verified in Mary. St. Thomas excludes from her the perfection of grace found in Christ but concedes her a plenitude of subjective grace because of her sublime dignity as Mother of God. He affirms, moreover, that this plenitude of grace is sufficient for the salvation of the human race (cf. *Super Ave Maria).* Most theologians admit that even her initial grace surpassed that of the most eminent saints and exalted angels.

The second condition, moral representation of the human race as its redeemer, must also be verified in Mary by reason of her position as mediatrix for all men. A mediatrix is one to whom God has committed our salvation in subordination to Christ; one who represents us all in the matter of our redemption and sanctification. Deny Mary moral representation, and you divest her mediation of all meaning. Moreover, this moral representation does not necessarily imply that Mary is the head of the human race, for the grace of headship implies more than the grace of mediatrix.

The third condition required in the man constituted by God at the head of the human race is that his grace have a divine orientation to merit and satisfy for all men. This condition is also verified in Mary. God conforms an individual's grace to the ends which He intends to accomplish through him. He intended that Mary should share with Christ in acquiring redemptive grace for all men. Therefore, her grace must have a divine intrinsic orientation toward meriting grace and satisfying for all men.

We should distinguish in Mary's grace three different functions: it sanctifies her as an individual; it fits her to be the Mother of God; it prepares her as co-redemptrix and mediatrix to cooperate actively with Christ in acquiring grace for us. Just as all the life of the Savior was directed to our salvation, so the life and activity of Mary were preordained by God in Christ for the realization of the three ends just mentioned.

We can say then that the older theologians have given us sufficient grounds for saying that Mary merited and satisfied condignly for all men, for we have demonstrated that the three conditions required by them for such mediation are verified in her.

A second argument for our position is one based on the principle that activity is proportioned to existence. Mary has been placed in an order above the rest of men. Therefore, her salvific activity should transcend that of the rest of men. But this can be only if she shares in acquiring redemptive grace by meriting and satisfying condignly *ex condignitate* for all men. For mediation on behalf of others by meriting grace congruously for them is common to all men.

With this doctrine we do not put Mary on a plane with Christ. Their meriting and satisfaction for all men are specifically different. Yet there is a true analogy between them in their redemptive and mediatory acts. This is clearly shown by enumerating the similarities and differences of the two in the mediatory act.

Let us consider the similarities first. Both the redemptive act of Christ and the co-redemptive act of Mary have their radical efficacy from the hypostatic order in which they are associated. This association in the hypostatic order and in its end requires in them a plenitude of grace. This plenitude of grace is the formal or immediate principle of their respective acts. It is by reason of this same association that their grace has a divine intrinsic orientation, essentially different from ours, to merit and satisfy for the human race.

Let us now enumerate some of the differences. The acts of Jesus are acts of the divine Person of the Word; while Mary's are those of a mere creature. The plenitude of Christ's grace is His own, while Mary's is derived from His. Christ's grace is capital, Mary's is not. The acts of Christ satisfy for sin and merit grace for all men in strict justice *(ex toto rigore justitiae),* those of Mary according to a divinely determined proportion *(ex condignitate).* Redemptive efficacy belongs to Christ's

acts essentially, to Mary's by participation.

In brief there is found intrinsically the same redemptive form in the acts of Jesus and Mary in a manner not completely different nor entirely the same, but in an analogical manner according to an analogy of proper proportionality.

Only in perfective mediation such as has been explained does the doctrine of Mary's mediation acquire unity and consistency. For in this explanation all the truths involved in her mediation have as their ultimate source the divine maternity, the true fount of all Mariology. Mary's participation in the redemption is nothing more than a consequence of this maternity, which places her in the hypostatic order and makes her an associate with Christ in the very end of the Incarnation. From this association it follows that with Christ she is to acquire and distribute grace to men. She cooperates with Christ by meriting this redemptive grace condignly *ex condignitate*. In this cooperation we find the full meaning of Mary's co-redemption as well as of her spiritual motherhood of all men. All the truths about Mary are brought into unity and harmony in this conception of her mediation.

ASSUMPTION AND SEPARATISM

"The Lady and the Issue" by Walter J. Ong, S.J., *The Month*, XCXII(1951), pp. 358-370.

Amidst the recent flood of writings on the Assumption, this article stands out by reason of its unique point of view. Taking as his point of departure the attacks on the dogmatic definition, Father Ong argues that this rejection of Mary's exaltation is an expression of the revolt against the mediated, maternal authority of the Church.

Separatists movements have emphasized rather than rejected authority under the paternal aspect it has in God, but they have refused the Church's mediated authority which can only be symbolized by the feminine. Woman is the symbol of submission, of passive dedication, of body, of the material; and separatists fear to bring these elements into the sphere of religion. This same dread is expressed in their refusal to acknowledge Sacraments and sacrifice. Marriage above all must be kept out of the realm of religion.

The attack on Mary is an attack on her motherhood, on the fact that she, as every mother, had her body ordered in submission to a child. She provided the material for Christ's Body and is inextricably bound up with matter. As Newman pointed out, heresies that attack Mary generally end by asserting that matter is evil.

But Mary's exaltation, to which the Assumption attests, is due precisely to her motherhood. Mary's elevation above all created beings is the exaltation and sanctification of the submissive and the material, and therefore prayer to her must always involve an element of humility.

By reason of Mary's engagement in matter, the dogma of the Assumption has a critical role today. It, perhaps even more than the Resurrection, keeps men from losing their grasp of the historical, concrete reality of the faith. To focus theology on Mary is to focus it on matter and the sanctification of matter. At a time when loose thinking about the Mystical Body overemphasizes the "mystical" and tends to make the Mystical Body a loose union of believers, the dogma of the Assumption keeps before us the organic notion of "body." Only where Mary is venerated and where the concept of Holy Mother Church is a natural frame of thought will one find the correct notion of the Mystical Body.

THE MISSION of RELIGIOUS SOCIOLOGY

EMILE PIN, S. J.

Among the most pressing problems facing the Church today are those arising from the deplorable social conditions in many parts of the world. Many are being attracted by secular solutions to the ills of our times and are consequently being lost to the Catholic faith. A positive Catholic answer to social needs, particularly on the parish level, is alarmingly necessary. This article which appeared in Revue de l'Action Populaire, *53 (1951)*, pp. *561-578, describes a method of facing this problem. More specifically it deals with the means of obtaining the information that is necessary to cope with the situation. The author spent several years in graduate work in law, sociology, and political science at the University of Paris. At present he is stationed at the theologate of Fourvière, Lyons, France.*

Leon and Trecor are two parishes in France. They are separated only by a river, and yet 97 percent of Leon's parishioners make their Easter duty, while only 7 per cent of Trecor's parishioners meet this minimum obligation. Why should the incidence of religious practice be so different in two parishes which are adjacent?

In some parts of the diocese of Lille, France, 80 percent of the population are practicing Catholics; of the remaining non-practicing 20 percent the great majority are workers. Considering the predominantly Catholic milieu in which they live, why precisely are the workers outside the Church?

These are questions to be answered by Religious Sociology. Its mission is to discover whether any correlation exists between religious practice and social conditions—political, economic, demographic, environmental.

Formal Object

After a long period of trial and error, Religious Sociology stands as an autonomous science and has discovered its formal object: the visible, social aspects of inner religious life in their relation with the entire social milieu. Its purpose, then, is not merely to study religious groups such as the diocese and parish, but the whole context of social life in so far as it has a bearing on the practice of religion. On the other hand, its scope is limited to the exterior and social manifestations of religious practice. It pretends neither to study the essence of religion nor to penetrate to the depths of personal devotion.

However, the study of visible acts and gestures would not in itself be adequate if the motivational force behind these acts and gestures were not understood. Therefore, the "comprehensive method" of Max Weber must be adopted. According to this "method" the visible acts of the social life can be legitimately recorded, classified, compared, only if one tries to relive the visible acts from within the social group.

If, therefore, the investigator wishes to penetrate to the spirit behind the acts, he has only one choice: to live the acts of faith in his own personal life. In other words, the Christian alone is capable of penetrating to the heart of the religious acts, and interpreting their meaning. On this account Catholics especially must not abandon to others the sociology of Catholic religious life, since they alone are adequately quali-

fied to interpret the findings of positive observation regarding their own religious behavior.

The Method

In order to attain the twofold objective of Religious Sociology—to know the religious group as such, and to explain the relationship between the religious group and its milieu—the investigator's first task is to study the total life of the group under investigation. The geographical environment, the social class structure, the standards of living, the housing conditions, the recreational activities, the operation of the juridical system, the attitudes and values held by the people as a group, the opinions, folkways, mores, fashions —these are a few of the areas that must be explored in order to understand the total social life of the group.

It is important in pursuing the investigation to avoid dogmatism and prejudice. To this end it is necessary not only to maintain an open mind without a preconceived thesis to prove, but also to be positively alert, sympathetic, and receptive. True, the sociologist cannot begin his study without formulating an hypothesis—a tentative explanation of social phenomena; but this hypothesis must be accurately formulated. Moreover, the objectives must be clear. If, for example, he is studying the religious practice in a parish, he must first decide whether the study is to deal with habitual practice or seasonal practice, and whether the subjects of the study are to be the permanent or transient population. If the investigator does not define his objective with precision, the result itself will be vague, tendentious, and devoid of practical use.

The second task of the investigator is to study the religious life of the group. The problem here will be to decide which external criteria must be used in order to determine the existence, form, and degree of religious life.

Criteria of Religious Life

The first criterion must be religious practice. Statistical tables must be constructed which include the frequency of weekday practice, ordinary practice, and seasonal practice. Then the degree of fervor in the religious practice must be ascertained. For example, to determine the degree of fervor of parishioners assisting at Mass, notice must be taken of attentiveness as well as active and collective participation in the ceremonies. Are missals used? What is the frequency of and participation in the Dialogue Mass, communal singing, etc.?

The second criterion is concerned with religious structures, that is, the parish organizations, such as those for men and women, school organizations in the parish, and the like.

The third criterion is the content of the parishioners' beliefs and their piety. What is the level of religious culture? Do the parishioners mix error and superstitions with the faith? Is the hierarchy of devotions safeguarded?

The fourth and final criterion is the degree of penetration of religious life into the total life of the group at large. Do the parishioners exert influence in non-religious groups in the area, such as trade unions, recreational clubs, etc.? What is the influence of religion in family life, in professional life, in neighborly interaction, in political elections, in children's education, in choice of newspapers and magazines, in leisure-time activities and entertainments? The whole institutional milieu must necessarily influence and be influenced by religious life. What is the degree of influence in this reciprocal relationship?

Comparison and Correlation

The third task of the investigator is to formulate comparisons and correlations within and between different groups. Such comparisons will be possible only if a common factor or trait is chosen, such as sex, age, housing, professional categories, social classes. After determining the common factor, the investigator may then correlate traits found in any or every parish. Thus comparisons between several parishes become possible.

Causes

Finally, the investigator must determine the causal influences underlying the positively correlated phenomena, for, as was stated above, the purpose of empirical study in Religious Sociol-

ogy is not only to know, but to explain. This, as was also indicated, can adequately be done only by the Catholic sociologist.

When the twofold objective of knowing and explaining a parish has been attained, parishes will be found to fall into various types. In other words, the principle of differential classification may be applied to whole parishes, and dioceses for that matter, so that they may be designated as static or dynamic, or as any of a number of specific categories under these genera. A typology of this sort is imperative if fruitful comparisons between parishes are to be made, and if forecasts of future religious health of a parish, diocese, or country are to be accurate and meaningful. The following classification of parishes according to types is not meant to be exhaustive, nor one which includes all existing parishes.

Types of Parishes

There are two types of *static* parishes, the *established* and the *refuge*. The *established* parish is distinguished by a perennial, collective religious practice, and it frequently has a theocratic organization. Two subtypes may be observed in the *established* parish. First, the *routine* parish; here the presence and activities of the Church are accepted without reflection or notable personal interest on the part of the parishioners. In this case the Church is just part of the social landscape. If the parishioners of a *routine* parish were to move from this accepted milieu, the danger would be great that they would not continue their religious life.

The second subtype of the established parish is the *faithful* parish. Here there is a more personal religious life, but still within a static framework. The people are imbued with a genuine religious formation so that their practice of religion is not affected by a change of residence.

The *refuge* parish, so-called because of its location, is found in the midst of a quasi-pagan milieu or a thoroughly pagan milieu. It is an island of traditional practice. The parishioners do not succumb to the injurious influences of non-Christian examples in the parish, but neither do they seek to christianize paganistic elements; hence, a static parish.

A *dynamic* parish is termed a *missionary* parish because in it there are active efforts on the part of the parishioners to expand Christianity among all social groups existing within the parish. Two subtypes may be observed: the *integrally missionary* parish, in which all parishioners participate actively in the dynamic missionary movement of dispersing the Christian influence to all social groups; and the *nuclear missionary* parish, in which a small core of parishioners are militantly active in christianizing the total milieu.

From what has been said it is obvious that the successful study of the science of Religious Sociology is an exacting and monumental work. Even so, this has not discouraged Catholic sociologists. Monographs have become more common during the past few years. Outstanding among these have been *France pays de mission* by Abbés Godin and Daniel, and two studies by Canon Boulard, *Problèmes missionnaries de la France rural* and *Essor ou déclin du clergé français*. These three works furnish model demonstrations of a sociological parish study.

In March, 1951, the Third International Conference of Religious Sociology met at Breda, Holland, with ninety-two delegates present representing twelve countries. *Lumen Vitae* (Vol. VI, Nos. 1-2, 1951, Eng. ed.) devoted an entire issue to reports of this conference dealing with progress made in Religious Sociology in France, Belgium, Holland, Germany, Canada, Latin America, and the United States.

"The Church's exhortation in favor of the Christian order, as the principal factor in securing peace, is at the same time an incentive to form a correct idea of true liberty. The ultimate reason is that the Christian order, since its purpose is peace, is essentially an order of liberty. It is the cooperative effort of free men and peoples toward the progressive realization in all spheres of life of the ends which God has assigned to humanity." Pius XII, *Christmas Eve Address, 1951.*

Human Evolution *and* Theological Implications

CYRIL VOLLERT, S. J.

Evolution of man from lower animals has long been a thorny problem, and even many educated Catholics are not certain as to the position that they as Catholics can or must take. Father Vollert gives a summary of scientific evidence and the Catholic teaching, outlines the solutions that are offered to reconcile the two, and then draws a short conclusion. This article is from the Proceedings of the Catholic Theological Society of America, *VI (1951), pp. 122-145.*

Fossil Men

From the viewpoint of outward appearance, three groups of fossil remains lead us to man of the modern type. First comes the group known as the Australopithecus; secondly, the Java man and the Peking man; thirdly, Neanderthal man. In the interest of simplification some other forms that are harder to classify are omitted.

The most ancient simian fossil having a human orientation was discovered in South Africa in 1924. Other fragments of the same type were found from 1936 to 1947. This group of hominoids, generally classed under the name "Australopithecus," is structurally closer to man than modern apes. The brain capacity is superior to that of living apes, the face is less projecting, and the teeth have some human traits. Remnants of long bones indicate an upright stature. The fossils are estimated to be about a million years old.

A further advance toward modern man is marked by the Java man and the Peking man. The first discovery in this group was made in 1891, when Eugene Dubois unearthed in Java the top of a skull, a thighbone, and several teeth. From such fragments the scientist assembled *Pithecanthropus erectus.* Later, from 1936 to 1941, nearby volcanic strata on Java gave up two lower jaws and three skulls, belonging to the same species or to a related, more primitive species, *Pithecanthropus robustus.* These fossils tend to confirm the reconstruction made by Dubois. The upper jaws with their teeth are simian, while the teeth of the lower jaw are more human. The creatures represented by these fragments lived upwards of half a million years ago. Although they probably lacked true intelligence, they are closer to man than is any living anthropoid.

More important is the Peking man, discovered in 1927 and the following years. Remains of twenty-five adult and fifteen infant skeletons were unearthed. The brain capacity of *Sinanthropus pekinensis* is considerably greater than that of Java man. The skulls are low-vaulted, with heavy brow ridges. The face projects and the chin recedes. A mixture of simian and human traits is noticeable in the teeth. Agreement that Peking man walked erect is unanimous. According to various estimates, he lived from 200,000 to 400,000 years ago. The Mauer jaw, found near Heidelberg in 1907, is sometimes associated with the Peking fossils, but is better classified as pre-Neanderthal. Heidelberg man is probably even more ancient than Peking man.

Neanderthal man flourished some 75,000 to 125,000 years ago, but lived

on after that. About a hundred skeletons of this type are known, and many of them are complete. Neanderthal man's brain capacity almost equals that of modern man. His forehead recedes somewhat, the skull is fairly high, the brow ridges are thick, and the chin is undeveloped. The teeth are clearly human. He used well-made tools, had definite religious convictions, and buried his dead with careful ritual.

This type is widely spread through Europe, North Africa, Asia, China, and Java. The fossils discovered in Palestine since 1925 exhibit a mingling of Neanderthal and modern features. High skulls and well-marked chins are common. This specimen is either an intermediate type on the road toward modern man, or more likely is a cross between Neanderthal and modern man. This is indicated by the fact that certain fossils of the Cro-Magnon group of *Homo sapiens* have Neanderthal traits.

Beginning with a period some 19,000 years ago, man of the modern type is well known. He is represented by tall individuals having high foreheads, no brow ridges, and full developed chins. But *Homo sapiens* is far older than that; his history goes back to an age when Neanderthal man did not yet exist or at least had not taken on his characteristic features. In 1912 important fragments of a skull and lower jaw permitted a tentative reconstruction of the Piltdown man. The cranium of this famous "dawn man" resembles that of living men, with a somewhat smaller brain capacity. The fossil remains of a related type known as Swanscombe man seem to settle the issue that men of modern structure lived 250,000 years ago, prior to the appearance of Neanderthal man.

The Kanam jaw, found in East Africa in 1932, provides the basis for an estimate that modern-type man may go back as far as 500,000 or even 900,000 years. The Kanjera skull from the same region is also extremely ancient. The antiquity of *Homo sapiens* is confirmed by two skulls, discovered in 1947 and 1948 at Fontéchevade in France; the fossils are dated at about 180,000 years ago. Three "Hotu man" skeletons, found in northern Iran in 1951, have skulls of the same form as those of modern men, although the brain capacity is less. Geological evidence suggests that Hotu man lived about 75,000 years ago.

Our present knowledge, which embraces many scores of fossils not mentioned here, indicates that the human branch did not pass through the stages of Australopithecus, Java man, Peking man, and Neanderthal man before arriving at the *Homo sapiens* level. Some early stages are more developed than following stages, or a "progressive" stage precedes the appearance of a more "primitive" one. In particular, some items of evidence point to the probability that men of the modern type may be the most ancient of all.

The Witness of Sacred Scripture

The two accounts of man's origin proposed in Genesis do not favor evolution. According to the first narrative, "God created man to His own image; to the image of God he created him; male and female He created them" (Gen. 1:27). The Hebrew word translated by "created" is employed exclusively of God's activity; and the divine causality extends to the production of the body, since it brings about a distinction between the sexes. Nothing in the text suggests the origin of the human body from pre-existing beings.

The other narrative is anthropomorphic in expression: "The Lord God formed man of the slime of the earth, and breathed into his face the breath of life; and man became a living soul" (Gen. 2:7). God is represented as fashioning the first man from the clay of the earth and as subsequently deriving the first woman from the man, to be his mate. The account is popular in character; yet it does not describe the origin of the first human couple as a climax in the evolution of living species.

Mind of the Magisterium

Nevertheless evolution of man's body from some subhuman species is not excluded. This is plain from the carefully chosen words of the Holy Father in his 1941 allocution to the Pontifical

Academy of Sciences. The Pope asserted that man is not the son of a brute animal, that the first woman was made from the body of the first man, and that man is endowed with a spiritual soul. With regard to other problems, including the manner in which the first man's body was formed, the Holy Father stated that the natural sciences may some day come forward with certain evidence, although as yet such is not the case.

Another document of great interest is the letter written in 1948 by the secretary of the Pontifical Commission for Biblical Studies to the Archbishop of Paris. The author observed that the official responses of the Biblical Commission on the historical character of Genesis "by no means block the way to a further, truly scientific investigation of these problems, in accord with the findings of the past forty years." He added that the early chapters of Genesis "recount, in simple and figurative language, adapted to the minds of less cultured men, the basic truths that are presupposed by the economy of salvation; along with a popular description of the origins of the human race."

The encyclical *Humani generis* expressly teaches that the direct creation of the human soul by God pertains to Catholic faith, and repeats what the Supreme Pontiff had said in 1941, that the derivation of man's body from organic matter had not yet been proved. Yet the discussion may continue among competent scholars who, however, must be ready to submit to the judgment of the Church if that should be forthcoming.

The First Man as Depicted by Theology

Like his contemporaries, St. Thomas had a sublime notion of man's original state. As he came from the hands of God, man was a splendid creature enjoying God's intimate friendship and endowed with original justice. This state is described by St. Thomas as a perfect harmony, comprising mainly three levels of submission. The first was the submission of the soul and especially of the will to God; this was the root of original justice. The second, flowing from the first, was the submission of the lower powers to reason. The third was the submission of the body to the soul as principle of life, and this assured immortality.

Adam possessed more than the supernatural gifts he was to transmit to his descendants. He was the first man, not only in time but in eminence, the father in whom were realized all the perfections of human nature. He was the cause of all the perfections found in mankind, enjoying them to a degree not to be reached by his posterity. In particular he was endowed with infused knowledge that put him in possession of all truth which the human mind could naturally know and which his children could ever learn.

Such, in brief, is the common theological description of the first man. Is the description valid? The fossil men we know did not rival Adonis in beauty and, to judge from the dimensions and convolutions of their brains, they did not possess the genius of Aristotle. We cannot recognize in them the perfections ascribed to the first man by theology.

Some Theories

Scientific evidence about human origins is still slight; enormous gaps remain. The fundamental difficulty is the fact that we do not know where or when the race began. *Where* did man first appear? Certainly not in America or Europe. Many conjecture that Asia is the birthplace of mankind, either southern Asia or the great central plateau. Others suggest India or the islands of Indonesia or Africa. But the simple truth is that we do not know.

When did man begin to inhabit the earth? The few fossils we possess may be tremendously remote from the original father. Behind any prehistoric man whose bones have been brought to light, long series of unkown ancestors lived and died and have left no trace. The cradle of the race cannot be made the object of methodical research, because we do not even know where it is.

Since the problems raised by the existence of prehistoric man cannot

now be solved with certitude, we can do no more than propose theories designed to reconcile faith or theology with the probable conclusions of the sciences of prehistory.

1. The regression theory. Certain human races whose fossils have been discovered are degenerate. With the loss of original justice entailed by man's sin, the soul ceased to dominate the body, and the reason could no longer fully control sense life. During the ages following Adam's fall, migrations carried masses of human beings into a progressive degradation. Under the weight of a hostile universe, man descended to the limits separating humankind from animality. In his organism that was still plastic he underwent anatomical changes that made him morphologically akin to the great anthropoids and, thus degraded, entered into the night of prehistory.

Such regression was not caused directly by the sin of Adam, but was the result of environment and all the new conditions in which the descendants of the original couple found themselves during their protracted wanderings. So little is known about evolution that regression cannot be declared impossible. Examples of recession in the animal world are numerous. An indication that retrogression has occurred among men is the fact that Neanderthal skulls having the more accentuated pithecoid traits are chronologically among the most recent. As the conditions of life varied enormously in the different areas reached by the migrating peoples, multiple races were gradually formed.

2. The "homo faber" theory. The fossils regarded as the remains of primitive human races perhaps belong to beings structurally close to man, although not pertaining to the human species. Such animals, lacking spiritual souls, would not be true men, but only pre-men. We can easily imagine such creatures, endowed with an organism almost as perfect as that of man and reaching, by the power of their senses, memory, and imagination, the limits separating sense cognition from intellectual knowledge. Their psychological faculties would far surpass those of the great apes; their abilities would explain the crude tools and the use of fire associated with extreme antiquity. The first true men, possessing spiritual souls and pertaining to the race of *Homo sapiens,* would appear on earth later.

This suggestion has won few adherents. The general verdict is that fireplaces and the discovery of tools indicate the presence of man. The theory bogs down under the weight of the growing awareness of Neanderthal's intellectual ability and Peking man's culture.

3. The theory of pre-Adamites in a state of pure nature. True men, not elevated to the supernatural state, may have lived prior to Adam and Eve. Into their bodies, which from the evolutionist point of view were incompletely disengaged from animality, God had infused spiritual souls. Vastly inferior to Adam and Eve in mental ability and anatomy, they were capable of progressive evolution, as may be attested by the fossil forms preceding the advent of modern races. Yet they were destined to die out before the appearance of the first couple mentioned in the Bible; for the coexistence of descendants of these primitives and descendants of Adam and Eve is incompatible with the dogma of original sin.

This hypothesis seemed to have some plausibility as long as prehistoric evidence indicated a break between Paleolithic and Neolithic cultures. But the discovery of a transitional Mesolithic culture closing the gap between the Old and New Stone ages, as well as the extreme antiquity of *Homo sapiens* fossils, has tended to discredit the theory.

4. Reconsideration of original man's natural perfection. This theory supposes that the gifts of original justice eminently supplied for the bodily perfection and cultural refinement which theologians have attributed to Adam and Eve. The loss of original justice laid bare the initial poverty of a human nature remaining uncultured but endowed with potentialities for evolving into more perfect forms.

The state of innocence does not

seem incompatible with a process of human development, whether bodily, intellectual, or moral. We know almost nothing about the physical appearance of our original human father. He was made according to the image and likeness of God; but this refers to his soul, not to his body. Not only the color of Adam's skin, but his build and the shape of his head are left undescribed in the Bible and, for all that we know, may have resembled the bodily characteristics of primitive fossil man. During the ebb and flow of the ice ages the descendants of the first pair, continually increasing in numbers, scattered over the various continents. Under the influence of changes in environment, food, climate, and occupation, along with natural selection and gene mutations, physical characteristics altered and new races developed. The Piltdown, Swanscombe, Neanderthal, and Cro-Magnon types may be representatives of Adam's descendants who wandered westward, while the Java and Peking fossils may be relics of those who migrated toward the east.

This theory stresses the truth that man's greatness is found in his soul, which was furthermore enriched with original justice. Whether the first man was fashioned by God from inanimate matter or from a living organism, the dogma of original justice is not endangered. Man started to be man when he received a spiritual soul. And God could have created this soul in the state of original justice.

The final word has not been said; the problem of human origin is still unsolved. Much more evidence is required, and certitude in the classification and dating of the evidence is imperative. No conflict between the faith and facts brought forward by the sciences of prehistory can possibly arise. Within the limitations of our present knowledge we can assert with confidence: a theory of evolution which admits that God, in infusing a soul into an animal organism, likewise effected all the modifications necessary to fit that organism for union with a human soul, runs afoul of no Scriptural or theological objection.

MUNIFICENTISSIMUS DEUS

"The Apostolic Constitution *Munificentissimus Deus* and Our Blessed Lady's Coredemption" by Juniper B. Carol, O.F.M., *The American Ecclesiastical Review,* CXXV(1951), pp. 255-273.

Father Carol cites about sixty theologians of the last few decades who would seem to favor the opinion that Our Lady's Assumption is *formally implicitly revealed* in Mary's total victory over Satan as foretold in Genesis 3:15. He thinks this opinion has been authoritatively confirmed by Pius XII in the Apostolic Constitution *Munificentissimus Deus.* In that document the Holy Father points out the relation between the Blessed Virgin's share in the Redeemer's struggle against Satan and the glorification of her body as a fitting close to that struggle, just as Christ's Resurrection was an essential part of His victory. Moreover, the Pontiff considers as traditional the designation of Mary as the *new Eve,* intimately associated with Christ in His struggle. Lastly, in *Munificentissimus Deus* the argument from the Protoevangelium (Gen. 3:15) seems to be given the greatest emphasis of all the biblical arguments. Since most theologians hold that a truth must be formally implicitly revealed to be definable, it is very unlikely, according to Father Carol, that the Pope would present as his most important and significant argument for the Assumption one that was merely a theological conclusion. In concluding, the author resolves the difficulties advanced by Father Bonnefoy, O.F.M., who still regards the argument as only theological; and he predicts an endorsement of his own interpretation by the majority of commentators on *Munificentissimus Deus.*

Myth and Miracle
AT MID-CENTURY

WILLIAM HALLOCK JOHNSON

From among the many current articles on miracles, this one was chosen for several reasons. It provides a clear summary of the progress of historico-critical exegesis of the New Testament, and it adds an acute analysis of the failure to discount miracles. Moreover, the fact that Dr. Johnson, a prominent Protestant scholar and former President of Lincoln University, views the critical conclusions with the same dissatisfaction that Catholic theologians and exegetes experience gives added interest to the article. This digest is taken from Theology Today, *VIII (1951), pp. 313-326.*

The popularity of C. S. Lewis' recent book on miracles (1947) shows that this topic still has a wide appeal. We believe that a study of New Testament criticism during the last half century justifies and demands a fresh examination of miracles.

Every student of the New Testament could with great profit trace from the beginning the course of criticism of miracles and especially the supreme miracle of the Resurrection. First came the Theory of Fraud, advocated by Reimarus. This did not long survive, because as Goguel bluntly said: "One could allow himself to be persecuted for an illusion but not for a fraud."

Next, the Naturalistic Theory of Paulus maintained that the miracles of Christ were exaggerated accounts of natural events. Though Strauss gave a fatal blow to the naturalistic swoon explanation of the Resurrection, the naturalistic theory survives in a new form. The Resurrection has been shifted from the field of history to that of psychology, and has come to mean, in Schweitzer's words, "Jesus as spiritually arisen among men." This ambivalence of language has made it possible to do away with the miracles of the Gospels altogether.

Strauss and Renan, in their Lives of Christ, dispose of miracles in summary and a priori fashion: since miracles are impossible, authentic history and biography must eliminate them at all costs. Strauss realized that this reduced the Gospel narrative to myth. At first he believed he could retain the values of Christian morality, but he ended by abandoning Christianity altogether.

Renan in his artistic and idyllic portrayal places Christ "at the highest summit of human greatness." Yet his eulogy turns into an exposure of one who was a moral failure, who hypocritically pretended to be a wonder-worker. His Jesus can command neither respect nor reverence. Strauss makes Jesus a problem for the historian, Renan a problem for the moralist. By their rejection of miracles both make it impossible for Jesus to retain his place in the affection and worship of mankind.

The first half of our century has seen the rise on the Continent of five distinct movements of New Testament criticism. We are interested in what the leaders of these five schools say on the subject of miracles.

1. School of the History of Religion

The movement was launched in Germany by the publication in 1904 of several handbooks of the History of Religion. Two of these, Paul Wernle's *Die Quellen des Lebens Jesu* and Wilhelm Bousset's *Jesus,* attack the order of Mark's Gospel as unhistorical. Wernle goes further: in Mark we must also disregard the ruling idea, namely, that Jesus was the Son of God. Miracles are so prominent in Mark that the histori-

cal portrait of Jesus has been distorted. Between Jesus and us stands an opaque medium, the faith of the primitive Church.

Bousset sees only legends in the miracles recorded by Mark. "We only know the Christ in whom the Church believed, and that the underlying historical Jesus is for us forever inaccessible." In his notable later work, *Kyrios Christos,* Bousset pictures Jesus as the product of the disciples' imagination, "surrounded by the golden nimbus of the miraculous." When we look beneath the golden sheen of miracle, the history has evaporated. In the same spirit Wrede can find in Mark only "faded remnants" of history.

The critics in their flight from miracle can find refuge only in the shadowland of unknowability. What they do not explain is how the early Church added just those elements of miracle and dogma that caused bitter hatred and the determination to exterminate the Church.

2. The Eschatological School

Albert Schweitzer in *The Quest of the Historical Jesus* (1906) gave to New Testament criticism a new direction. Jesus becomes a rapt enthusiast, expecting that before the disciples returned from their mission in Galilee He would be transformed into the Messianic Son of Man. Disappointed in this He shifted to the belief that at His death there would be a transformation, resurrection, and parousia of Himself as the futuristic Messiah. The supernatural is reduced to a delusive eschatological hope. Jesus died upon the Cross in hopeless disillusionment and defeat. There was no resurrection. In the end Schweitzer disowns his own eschatological Jesus as having no value for religion. ". . . it is not Jesus as historically known, but Jesus as spiritually arisen within men, who is significant for our time and can help it."

Schweitzer's historical method is open to question. He looks to Mark for his eschatology, but then dismisses Mark's own eschatology in a footnote and has to go to Matthew 10:23 for his basic proof-text. Of miracles Schweitzer says: "With Strauss begins the period of the non-miraculous Life of Jesus . . . In the modern period it has lost all importance . . . so that miracle no longer concerns the historian either positively or negatively."

Sainte-Beuve has said that Renan offered Jesus a seat at the summit of humanity on condition of His abdication from the throne of God. Schweitzer's portrait of Jesus is also a dethronement. He is no longer the world's great Teacher, but a self-deluded enthusiast, a pathological megalomaniac. This is not the picture of one who has won the empire of human hearts, or who inspired Schweitzer to spurn the honors won by his achievements in many fields, and to plunge into the African jungles to minister to human need.

3. The School of Form Criticism

Scholars between the two wars developed a new and promising method. In the hope of finding a true picture of Jesus of Nazareth they studied the thirty years or more of oral tradition that preceded the Gospels. The leaders in this movement have been Martin Dibelius and Rudolph Bultmann.

Form Criticism is a complex of various elements, but its leading features can be set forth in few words. Scattered traditions about Jesus were treasured in memory by a devoted group of friends who formed the nucleus of what came to be called the Church. These fragments of tradition, repeated with elaborations and legendary embellishments were gradually modified. They were run into certain "forms" or patterns and became so stereotyped as to be regarded as obligatory. After many years of this process an author strung together these floating anecdotes and sayings of tradition, editorially adding particulars of time and place—the result is the connected narrative of one of our Gospels.

The method of our form critics is different from that of their predecessors, but the result is the same. Where Bousset leaves a void, Dibelius and Bultmann leave a vacuum. In both cases the elimination of miracles and Christology destroys the history. Bultmann confesses that, "We know as good as nothing of the life and personality of Jesus."

The closely-knit Passion Narrative, admittedly early, and not fitting in any of the "forms," is a stumbling block. The Passion Narratives show that the Gospels were written in the conviction of the victory of the Resurrection. Without the Resurrection, the greatest of the miracles, no traditions about Jesus would probably have long survived. There would have been no Church to mold these traditions to its purpose, and no Kerygma or Gospel to preach.

Evidence accumulates that when the miracles and the attendant Christology are removed from the Gospels, very little of history is left and very little that is of any importance for religion.

4. The French Skeptical School

The stampede of Continental critics toward the goal of mythicism approaches a climax in Charles Guignebert's *Jesus* (1933) and Alfred Loisy's *The Origins of the New Testament* (1936). Maurice Goguel, whose *Life of Jesus* (1937) closes with the crucifixion, has affinities with these authors, but is much more conservative. All three scholars carry on a spirited polemic with the complete mythicists, but Guignebert and Loisy come periously close to denying the existence of Jesus.

Guignebert describes Jesus as "an ignorant man" with only a limited horizon. To impute to Jesus unusual spiritual gifts or depths of insight "is a kind of tenacious survival of the inherited belief in his divinity." Jesus is consistently belittled and pushed into an obscure corner of history.

Skeptical tendencies had gained the ascendancy in Loisy by the time he wrote *The Origins of the New Testament*. Such expressions as "pure fiction," "redactional embroidery" are scattered liberally through his comments on the Gospels. He says that the authors of the Gospels introduce "redactional miracles" and "multiply miracles to satiety" with as little scruple as in multiplying metaphors.

Loisy deviates from well-supported critical opinion in two ways. First, supposing that the Gospel stories are the invention of the Church, he *predates* these by saying that they were put back proleptically into a record of the ministry. Second, he *post-dates* the New Testament books far beyond the limits, for instance, of Harnack's *Chronologie*.

5. The De-Mythologizing School

The most recent school of criticism, still in the process of formation and delimitation, has grown out of an essay by Bultmann, *Kerygma und Mythos* (1941). His thesis is that the New Testament and its message need to be de-mythologized to be made acceptable to the modern mind. Written when men believed in miracles and that the spirits of men were worked upon by supernatural forces, the Gospels are incredible for us today. Man now, taught by science and psychology, regards himself as a unitary and autonomous being, and cannot believe that foreign powers invade his inner life.

When the storm of de-mythologizing has passed over the New Testament a single object—the Cross—is left standing amid the wreckage. But the Cross in our age has lost the old associations: satisfaction, substitution, redemption through blood. It is first stripped of the meaning it admittedly had with the apostles, and then arbitrarily identified with the Resurrection. But the Resurrection, too, has changed its meaning. It is not a "credible miracle" as the New Testament writers thought it was, for "what kind of a historical event could it be whose actuality hangs upon a rising from the dead?"

A theologian, H. Thielicke, sees in Bultmann a shift from theology to the Existentialist notion that man can by self-assertion find his better self. Bultmann tries to go beyond Existentialism, but he has made for himself an impasse when he says that the Cross is "an act of God which first makes possible self-surrender, faith, love, and the real life of man." Such an act of God is plainly an invasion of the autonomy of modern man, and we are back in the "mythology" and schizophrenia from which Bultmann has been at pains to free the Kerygma.

Bultmann has been the leader of a new Docetism which has made a phantom of Jesus of Nazareth. Some will think that this flight from miracle, this freeing of Jesus from history will be a

gain for faith. We suspect rather that the end of this *via negativa* will be the worship with the Athenians of an "unknown God."

Conclusions

Our review of fifty years of criticism leaves us with two choices only. We must dismiss Jesus of Nazareth and allow Him to retire into the cloudland of mythicism. Or we must allow Him to appear in his inapproachable glory as He is pictured in the Gospels.

Time after time we see how impossible it is to draw any consistent and convincing portrait of a non-miraculous Jesus. We see again that the miracles are not an embroidery upon the fringe of the Gospels, but that they are woven into the very heart and substance of the Gospels. When they are removed the whole fabric falls to pieces, and Jesus has no longer any secure place in history.

Philosophical bias has prevented the leading critics from listening to competent and unimpeachable testimony. The result is that the mythical has gained steadily and inexorably over the historical. The critics have robbed the Gospel of its power. They have left a blank where men have looked for inspiration and comfort for this life and hope for the life to come. They have made the Great Physician impotent to heal, and made the strong Son of God into a weakling and a nobody. The critics in their flight from miracle have arrived at a sort of *reductio ad absurdum.* The dominating figure of history from whose birth the years of time are measured, whom the world reveres as its highest ideal and the Church worships as the Lord of Glory, is denied any recognizable place in history and made to disappear in a cloud. By their complete and confessed failure to draw a credible portrait of a non-miraculous Jesus, the critics have unconsciously built up a strong and cumulative argument, albeit a negative one, for the truth of the Gospel miracles.

SCIENCE AND GOD

"According to the measure of its progress, and contrary to affirmations advanced in the past, true science discovers God in an ever-increasing degree —as though God were waiting behind every door opened by science. We would say that from this progressive discovery of God, which is realized in the increase of knowledge, there flow benefits not only for the scientist himself when he reflects as a philosopher—and how can he escape such reflection?—but also for those who share in these new discoveries or make them the object of their own considerations.

"Genuine philosophers profit from these discoveries in a very special way, because when they take these scientific conquests as the basis for their rational speculations, their conclusions thereby acquire greater certainty, while they are provided with clearer illustrations in the midst of possible shadows, and more convincing assistance in establishing an ever more satisfying response to difficulties and objections . . .

"The knowledge of God as sole Creator, now shared by many modern scientists, is indeed the extreme limit to which human reason can attain. Nevertheless it does not constitute the last frontier of truth. In harmonious cooperation, because all three are instruments of Truth, like rays of the same sun, science, philosophy and, with still greater reason, Revelation, contemplate the substance of this Creator whom science has met along its path, unveil His outlines and point out His features. Revelation, above all, makes His presence, so to speak, immediate, vitalizing and loving, like that presence of which either the simple faithful or the scientist is aware in his inner soul when he recites unhesitatingly the concise terms of the ancient Apostles' Creed: 'I believe in God, the Father Almighty, Creator of heaven and earth . . .'"

Address of Pope Pius XII to the Pontifical Academy of Science, November 22, 1951.

Are Miracles Possible?

HEIMO DOLCH

This digest discusses the age-old, but still current, objection that science is opposed to miracles. It points out that recent trends in science place emphasis on the scientist's incompetence to judge something that lies outside his field. This article was a lecture given by Dr. Dolch at the University of Münster on the occasion of his reception of a doctorate in theology. It was published in Theologie und Glaube, *XLI (1951), pp. 210-218.*

On October 13, 1917, the great miracle of the sun occurred at Fatima. Authentic eyewitness accounts, agreeing substantially with one another, describe the sun's unusual activity, climaxing in its plunge earthward. This phenomenon, witnessed by between fifty and seventy thousand people, cannot be explained by mass suggestion, since persons, more than seven miles from Fatima who were completely ignorant of the preceding events, describe it in the same way. The miracle was not unrelated to other events at the scene. Many reports, for example, relate that after the miracle the clothes of the bystanders were completely dry, despite the drenching rain of a few minutes before. An unprejudiced reader must admit that something real took place at this miracle of the sun.

Yet no observatory anywhere in the world reported anything unusual. Nor are there any reports of a solar change from submarine bases or artillery positions, though war was raging in 1917. This hard-to-refute silence of the rest of the world makes it difficult for us to accept the sun-miracle as a reality. From the viewpoint of our experience and knowledge, the viewpoint from which we usually judge individual events, we set it down as improbable, and its acceptance become difficult, if not impossible.

If we take this attitude, we are following in the footsteps of David Hume, who held as a basic principle that "no witness suffices to establish a miracle so that . . . the falsity of the witness would be more astonishing than the event he seeks to establish."

Hume's reflections were followed by natural scientist and philosopher alike during the two succeeding centuries. As the horizon of the laws of nature was determined more exactly and the entire realm of the experiential scientifically investigated, their acceptance grew the stronger.

Let us examine one field of natural science, that of physics, and investigate the significance of its discoveries and conclusions with relation to the possibility of miracles.

It is frequently said that physicists have learned that their laws are, in the last analysis, laws of probability, not of causality. Hence, it is believed, what the theologian calls a miracle can once again be given a hearing. In our opinion, however, it is an oversimplification to say that the causality of classical physics has been succeeded by the probability of modern physics.

The significance of the achievements of modern physics lies in the fact that they have proved that the presuppositions of the old questions are questionable, even erroneous in part. The assumptions of Hume, then, ought to be reexamined to see if they have not been disproved by the facts.

Physicists of the classical period believed their point of departure was a "naive" knowledge of nature, and they looked on their propositions as the more or less unique way of clarifying, deepening, and systematizing this knowledge. Modern physicists, on the other hand, understand that their assertions, made from a definitely determined viewpoint and acquired by a consciously determined methodology, are incomplete expressions

of a reality which in its totality cannot be comprehended by physics alone. They have placed in high relief this note of specialization.

The concern of all natural science is first to consider a partial area of reality as a self-contained system and to comprehend the elements of this system in their mutual coordination; then to ascertain the mutual causality of this system with more extensive sections of reality; and, advancing in this way, to discover ever more universal natural laws governing the mutual, functional relations. This remark becomes more intelligible if we remember that advances in research have shifted interest from the individual body or instance to the underlying factors of forces and fields.

Scientific research is interested in discovering the major, functional coordinations of the events of nature insofar as they are dependent on other events. In addition to observing, describing, and understanding events, the scientist must also delimit them as dependent. This is of capital importance.

This conception of science, neglected by Hume and the classical physicists and clearly taught by modern physics, determines the limit of natural science. From this conception it follows that, once the scientific system has been built up in detail, we can no longer decide whether or not a particular bit of reality has been introduced from without. Hume's rejection of the possibility of miracles proves that he looked on the horizon of natural science as all-inclusive, incapable of admitting of another horizon outside of, and over against, itself. If, on the other hand, the abstractive character of natural science is fully appreciated, Hume's rashness becomes evident.

Strictly speaking, as natural scientists we can neither raise the question of, nor deny the possibility of, miracles. For our viewpoint is seen to be horizontal and concerned with the order of the "next-to-one-another." On the vertical plane, however, the plane of the relation between Creator and creature, the question of the possibility of miracles takes on meaning.

If we admit that the question of miracles is a philosophical and theological one, we do not thereby abolish the self-sufficiency, the right, or the obligation of scientific research. It must be carefully shown whether and where something no longer comes within the field of natural science, whether and where God's activity breaks into our world.

The question of miracles pertains above all to theology. God's activity in and through miracles does not consist in His concurrence with natural events knowable by unaided science. Miracles belong to the order of salvation since, in accord with their purpose, they open up the possibility of knowledge about supernatural truth. For this is indeed, as H. Schnell says, the "eschatological concept of the miracle; in it the laws and forces of the future world are already at work, as the sun in the gray of early morning."

The purpose of these remarks is to give an impetus to certain possibilities within the field of scientific research, possibilities opening up in our day. We do not demand that the natural scientist with the scientific means at his disposal positively establish a miracle as a miracle. We believe only that certain scientific conclusions of modern physics provide a basis for our view that the natural scientist can prove that natural laws have been transcended in a given instance —and that, precisely in so far as he can no longer explain the event by the laws of nature.

It is perhaps true to say with Gerhard Krueger that the historical meaning of natural science is its "triumph over both the uncertainty of the contingent and dependence on an uncertain fate." There is abundant evidence, however, that this triumph was primarily understood of, and sought on the technological level. We must recognize that this triumph was purchased at the price of materializing modern life because modern man accepted the horizontal plane of natural science as alone valid. This materializing of our life will decrease in proportion to our knowledge and recognition of the vertical plane of God and creature. And miracles in particular should help to establish the existence and value of this horizon. Our dependence on an uncertain fate will then truly be overcome, for this fate is bound up with that "love which makes the sun and all the stars to move."

Vernacular
IN THE LITURGY

MARIANO PALACIOS, O. S. B.

Recent years have seen a striking revival of interest in liturgy. As the movement to increase the participation of the laity has gained momentum, the question of the liturgical language has drawn increasing attention. In many places there has been a definite trend toward the use of the vernacular in the Church's public worship, and the Holy See itself has granted certain concessions along this line. However, there still remain many objections and difficulties in a full-scale adoption of the vernacular. In this article Dom Palacios gives a rather comprehensive view of the arguments for and against the vernacular. The original article was published in Liturgia, *VI (1951), pp. 206-217. Dom Palacios, a monk of the Abbey of Santo Domingo de Silos in Spain, is a frequent contributor to* Liturgia.

The problem of introducing the vernacular into those parts of the liturgy at which the laity assist or in which they participate is the subject of considerable discussion and debate in the present liturgical movement. Some change in favor of the vernacular seems desirable. Many liturgical functions, it is safe to say, present the sorry picture of a bored and distracted congregation paying no attention to and taking no part in religious worship simply because they understand nothing of it.

The liturgy, however, is meant to be, in part, an instruction and a prayer, that is, a dialogue between God and man. It would seem only natural in instruction and conversation to use a language understood by the people involved. From this it follows, according to the extreme "practical" opinion, that the living tongue should always be used in acts of worship, so that everyone might pray in the language he speaks and would need no earthly intermediary other than the voice of the priest.

The conservative view, on the other hand, points to difficulties which must at least counsel prudence and method in the realization of this ideal.

A third opinion, utilizing principles from both extremes, though not agreeing wholly with either, offers a preliminary intermediate solution, one which may be the ideal in the circumstances.

We shall here briefly explain the arguments advanced in favor of these different positions. It should be noted at the outset, however, that one should not have recourse to theological principles in solving the question of liturgical language. For from a theological point of view, it makes no difference whether we use one language or another in religious worship. There is no sacred language properly so-called; rather, a language becomes sacred when the Church gives it a sacred character by using it in divine worship. Tradition shows that many languages have received such a sacred character and that all languages can receive the same.

The following arguments are advanced in favor of the use of Latin: (a) Latin derives its sacred character from its sanctification by Christ on the cross. (b) It is the language of the dogmatic tradition of the Church. The liturgy is intimately connected with dogma and is its channel. The fact that

each language has words and idioms which are untranslatable into another language interferes with the translation of this dogmatic content of the liturgy. (c) Why make innovations when for centuries the Church and even the laity has tolerated the situation? (d) Catechisms on the liturgy, translations, and popular literature suffice for explaining the liturgy. (e) The use of the vernacular fosters the multiplication of doctrinal errors. Pope Pius XII says, "The use of Latin is an efficacious remedy against the corruption of authentic doctrine." (f) The objection to the use of Latin in the liturgy would seem to be due to Protestant influence, for this, in fact, was one of the first reforms initiated by Luther and his followers. (g) The use of Latin betokens the unity of the Church. If, on the contrary, the vernacular were to be used, each nation would seem to be an independent Church, fostering the exclusivist tendencies of exaggerated nationalism. Such national Churches would seem an anomaly to Catholic tourists in a foreign land. Besides, in some regions one and the same parish has to serve the needs of people who speak different languages. (h) Furthermore, living languages undergo continual change, and liturgy should not be placed at the mercy of neologisms and style and literary tastes. (i) There would also rise the problem of adapting Gregorian chant to the new translation. (j) One of the foremost objections is the shortcomings necessarily consequent upon translation. Tradition has sanctified some words which not only express a definite meaning, but also possess a certain elegance and piety which cannot be found in modern terminology. Again, almost all liturgy is written in a poetic or at least a classic style, and it is difficult to preserve in translation the artistic beauty of such style, even if the exact meaning is retained. Furthermore, it is not desirable that the people be aware of all the mysteries in the faith, not only because they lack the philosophical and theological training necessary for the proper understanding of these mysteries, but also because a certain amount of reserve fosters veneration and respect. (k) The Fathers of Trent speak of Latin as a classic, noble, literary language and deny these qualities apply to the vernacular languages. (It must be pointed out that most of the vernacular languages had not yet reached their classic period.)

In Favor of the Vernacular

In opposition to these reasons for the Latin, the "vernacularists" present their list of arguments: (a) Those who favor the use of the vernacular find support for their position in I Cor. 14:6,9: "Brethren, what good can I do by coming and talking to you in strange languages, . . . it will be like talking to the empty air." (b) Tradition provides a second argument. Although tradition has been cited in favor of the use of Latin, nonetheless, it seems rather to buttress the argument of those who favor the vernacular. It is true that the present liturgical language, Latin, is a dead language. Yet this language was once the language of the people and was, in fact, substituted for Greek in the liturgy from the second to the fourth century at which time Greek ceased to be intelligible to the Christians of Rome and Africa. This use of the living language in divine worship is still the actual practice of the Oriental Church. Greek, Syrian, Coptic, and Abyssinian are all modern languages. (c) Reason itself seems to favor this position. Each man has a right to be instructed in a language which he understands, and liturgy is a form of instruction. Above all, it is prayer, a dialogue. But to think and speak we needed words which we can understand. The will itself requires words before it can love. Faith too needs words, for *fides ex auditu, auditus per verbum.* Furthermore, the present high level of culture makes it difficult for many to submit their understanding until they see the motive, the reason for doing so. Finally, the desire to use a language one understands springs from man's natural instinct, and ultimately comes from God. (d) The use of Latin fosters formalism, making the liturgy a sterile and lifeless ritualism, a body without a soul.

Such a liturgy lacks appeal to the heart and to the mind, the very soul of religious rites. To this problem, the use of the mother tongue offers the best solution. (e) Liturgy is also a work of the people, of the ecclesiastical community, of the entire praying congregation, who participate in the royal priesthood of Jesus Christ, according to the testimony of St. Peter. Yet how can the people answer "Amen," asks St. Paul (I Cor. 14:16), if they do not know what is being asked for in the prayer which has been recited? (f) Nor does it seem to be an exaggeration to blame language in part for the lack of liturgical spirit in so many of the faithful. How difficult it is to pay attention to what one does not understand; and, if thought is father to action, how can one put into practice what one has not grasped? (g) Finally, this opinion has in its favor the present practice of the Oriental Church. The prevalence of the vernacular may very well account for the well developed liturgical spirit not only among the clergy but also among the faithful of that Church.

Steps Toward the Vernacular

It is rash indeed to think that the whole problem would be solved if ecclesiastical authority were abruptly and absolutely to impose the use of the vernacular. On the contrary, if the innovation is to be carried out successfully, there must be some preparation.

The introduction of the vernacular into the liturgy could be facilitated by the attainment of two objectives: make sacred, if we may say so, the living language; and prepare the mentality of the people for the new practice by intermediate experiments. Perhaps a third means of preparation would be the retention of Latin for some of the more familiar parts of the liturgy, and the use of the vernacular in others, for example, in the Epistle.

As a happy mean and a first step toward the new practice, the leaders of the liturgical movement in Germany propose the following adaptation. The vernacular should be used in the Proper of the Mass, with the exception of the Introit and the Secret Prayers. These latter are to be said in Latin. The other parts of the Mass are to retain their present form.

(The author in his original article also treats briefly the directives of the Holy See on the question, chiefly as expressed in the Council of Trent and the encyclical *Mediator Dei,* and gives a schematic history of the movement toward the introduction of the vernacular in different countries.)

SOCIAL ECONOMICS OF POPE PIUS XII

"Social Economics of Pope Pius XII" by John F. Cronin, S.S., *Sign,* December, 1950, January and February, 1951.

Although Pope Pius XII has not issued a major social encyclical, his social teachings have been set forth in about fifty important broadcasts, allocutions, and letters, in which he has developed a major social program to cope with the problems of the post-war world.

These articles essay an integration of these teachings. The theme of Pius XII's major contribution to the body of papal social doctrine is that the evil of our times is the naked and unrestricted power that strikes at man's dignity and freedom. The restoration of man's dignity and freedom demands the diffusion of property, and a structure of society that will be a foundation for man's dignity and freedom.

Thus power will be diffused through diffusion of ownership. Concretely, this means "a just wage, which covers the needs of the worker and his family." More than that, it calls for the conservation and protection of a social order which will make possible an assured, if modest, private property for all classes of society.

Christ — THE THEME OF APOSTOLIC PREACHING

ANDRE RETIF, S. J.

The interest in revitalizing Catholic preaching and instruction has led to a re-examination of the methods of preaching that are described in the books of the New Testament. This present article has as its thesis that the preaching of the Apostles to non-Christians centered around the figure of Christ. For his proof, the author confines himself to the Acts of the Apostles. The application of Father Retif's conclusions to the modern scene is too obvious to require expansion. This article is taken from Eglise Vivante, *III (1951), pp. 158-176. Father Retif at the present time lives in Paris and is engaged in writing books and giving lectures on missiology. Several of his articles on missiology have appeared in European theological journals.*

Today considerable emphasis is placed on the fact that Christianity is not so much a doctrine as it is the cult given to Christ. If this is true, the figure of Christ should dominate both the instruction given to the faithful, and to a greater extent the missionary preaching to non-Christians. And if we analyze the Acts of the Apostles, we shall find that the primary topic that the first apostles preached was the person of Christ. This was especially true of the kerygmatic preaching, that is, the preaching of the faith to non-Christians.

Central Place of Christ

At first sight one might think the main object of the Apostles' kerygmatic preaching was to proclaim ***salvation***. As a matter of fact, "salvation" is found frequently in Acts, and kerygmatic preaching is referred to as "the word of salvation" (13:26). But, though the word occurs often, salvation is not the central topic of the apostolic teaching. It is the person of Christ that pervades and dominates the kerygmatic preaching from its very beginning.

All the discourses to non-Christians announce Christ. Even the discourse of St. Paul to the Athenians, which is unique in many respects, proclaims Christ. In fact, it is at the mention of Christ's Resurrection that the hearers begin to mock and walk away.

In the very first kerygmatic sermon, delivered on Pentecost, Peter alludes to Christ in every verse (2:14-39). The discourse which follows the cure of the lame man bears the same stamp: Christ is the climax of prophetical history, the center of the world's destiny, the salvation and author of life (3:12-26).

In the explanation given to Cornelius, Christ is the sole topic of discussion (10:36 ff.). And later, Paul will use an entire discourse to describe how Christ came into his life (26:9 ff.).

In all the sermons cited so far, Christ was explicitly the topic. But the best proof that Christ holds the central place in the kerygmatic preaching of Acts is to be found in the passing references to the missionary preaching. Here the theme or framework of kerygmatic instruction is frequently summed up as "preaching Jesus" or "preaching Christ." The point that impressed Felix in the debates about Christianity was that it concerned "one Jesus deceased,

whom Paul affirmed to be alive" (25:19). Furthermore, the very name of the disciples was taken from the name "Christ." Finally, the disciples are persecuted not so much as teachers of a new religion, but as heralds of a person, Christ.

Therefore, it seems incontestable that the person of Christ was the central object of the preaching to non-Christians in Acts.

Content of the Christology

What facts of the life of Jesus are recorded in the kerygmatic preaching of Acts? First we might mention the stress laid on the "prehistory" of Christ, that is, the place He has in the prophecies of the Old Testament. Secondly, the lack of detail concerning His private or public life on earth. Thirdly, the great stress laid on the two historic facts of the Passion and the Resurrection. Little emphasis is placed upon the mystery of the Incarnation. The first heralds of Christ seemed to know Him no longer in His earthly life, so completely did the suffering and risen Christ pervade their whole teaching.

The Resurrection holds a more important place than Christ's death. His Apostles speak of themselves as witnesses to the Resurrection, but they do not say with the same insistence that they are witnesses to His death. Even to the Athenians, who would have no part of a resurrection, Paul proclaims the fact of Christ's rising from the dead.

Frequently the concept of the Resurrection is made to include the concept of glorification, which comprises the Ascension, the Enthronement at the right hand of the Father (2:35, 5:31, 7:56), the manifestation of the power of the glorified Christ (3:13), the outpouring of the Spirit (2:33), the marvelous diffusion of the gospel, and Christ's office as universal Judge (10:42, 17:31). In a word, the glorification of Christ calls attention to His universal dominion (2:36).

For the early Christians the risen Christ was truly the Lord who dominated the history of the world.

Missionary Character of Christology

Various elements enter into the kerygmatic preaching in Acts. There is an apologetic element, a theological element, and what we might call a kerygmatic element. The first two elements are always subordinate to the third, namely, to the preaching of the person of Christ. The heralds of Christianity do not seem at all preoccupied with showing the reasonable foundation of the faith, its logic, or the nobility of its moral code. There is the positive effort to prove that Christ is the Messias, but even proofs of His Messiaship are subordinated to devotion to His person.

The theological element of the kerygmatic preaching, all commentators agree, is slight: the Father's part in the Resurrection is mentioned in 2:24, the dogma of the Trinity is but vaguely hinted at, and the Incarnation is treated only implicitly. The theological element in Acts is more evident in the prayers and the worship of the early Christians than in the kerygmatic sermons.

Just as the Gospels are revelations of the person of Christ rather than apologies, so the kerygmatic preaching of Acts is an enchanting presentation of Christ rather than a series of rational arguments.

Neither the apologetic nor the theological aspect of the apostolic preaching can account for the abundance of titles given to Christ. He is not only the son of David (2:30), and greater than he (2:39), not only the servant of God (3:13), but also the Holy One (3:14), the Just One (7:52, 22:40), the Universal Judge (10:42), the Author of life (3:15), the Master of all (10:36), the Savior and Leader (5:31), and finally Lord (2:36).

Christ's divinity is not explicitly brought out in the kerygmatic discourses, but it is implied in the worship which they enjoin. The Apostles are not intent on detailed instruction, but strive rather to pass on their enthusiastic devotion to the God-man. It is this devotion that transformed the first kerygmatic sermon, delivered by St. Peter on the day of Pentecost,

into one long hymn of praise of Christ. St. Peter attempts to prove nothing. He wants only to show his love. After such a discourse, the Jews can draw but one conclusion: it is worthwhile to follow such a Leader.

St. Paul manifests the same devoted spirit in his discourse to the people of Antioch. The word which keeps coming back to his lips is the name of Jesus. At first sight the discourse of St. Stephen to the Jews seems to contain only one allusion to the person of Jesus. But the entire discourse leads up to that allusion.

Christ is presented as the leader and guide who gives history its meaning. He is the Master of all (10:36), the *archegos* of the way (3:15), commander and Savior (5:31), the cornerstone (4:11). He is the Lord of all.

Once the new convert recognizes that Christ is his Lord, kerygmatic preaching gives way to catechesis. The work of this catechesis will be to bring out in greater detail the character of Christ. But at first the convert must follow the Master without as yet knowing Him well. This initial adherence to Christianity is, of course, reasoned and reasonable. Yet it is essentially an enthusiastic giving of oneself to the cause of Christ. To arouse this self-dedication is the purpose of the kerygmatic preaching.

Some Missionary Applications

Kerygmatic preaching, then, is the first preaching of a missionary to non-Christians. Its purpose is to bring the listener to the first stage of the faith. He who has benefited from this kerygmatic sermon will perhaps know little about the details of Christianity, but his whole being will have been given to the divine Guide. He then becomes a catechumen, and after instruction enters the Church.

We see many cases in which men were won to Christ by their first encounter with Him: Peter and Andrew, James, Philip, the Samaritan woman, Zacheus, and others. For them Christianity was truly a way, and Christ was the road. In Him they found a leader, and from the outset they knew where they were going.

As a consequence of the work of such men as Prat, Grandmaison, Guardini, and others, the central place of Christ in the presentation of Christianity is becoming more and more emphasized. Also, Pontifical documents dealing with missionary activity have always insisted that the work of evangelization should converge on the figure of Christ.

Thus the initial missionary work is the preaching of Christ in the strict sense. And the value of such preaching can be measured by the degree to which it announces Christ. We must make the listener share the fervor and assurance of our faith in Christ. One flame ignites another. Arouse the listener's enthusiasm and he will be ready to dedicate his whole life to Christ.

CAN THEOLOGY BE PREACHED?

"Dogmatic theology, in the form in which it is historically developed, does not offer us the truths of revelation in the form in which we must preach it. Just as we do not use chemists as cooks . . . neither should we use scholastic theology in a weak and watered-down form as preaching. I do not say that the sparkling dew of morning which decks the flowers after a summer night is H_2O (although the fact is absolutely correct). Neither can I stir the hearts of men with the fact that sanctifying grace is a physical accident."

H. Rahner, in ***Eine Theologie der Verkuendegung.***

World History AND THE REDEMPTION

KARL LOWITH

During the past five years a remarkable number of Catholic and Protestant thinkers, particularly in Europe, have published articles on the theology of history. The present article by Dr. Löwith has been selected chiefly because of the valuable background it gives on Augustine and Hegel, the wellsprings of modern theories of history. This article is taken from Dieu Vivant, *18 (1951), pp. 59-77, and summarizes the content of the author's recently published book,* Meaning in History *(Chicago University Press, 1949).*

Modern philosophies of history have their beginning with Voltaire's attempt to refute Bossuet's *Discours sur l'Histoire universelle,* the last of Augustinian theologies of history. Bossuet had tried to coordinate the date and facts of the Biblical history of salvation with those of universal political history, using as his central guides the universality of Divine Providence and the position of the Church as the focal point of the world's happenings. Voltaire, professing that his was a philosophy of history, rejected Divine Providence and replaced it with a reliance on human reason. As a result, his history became a history of civilization, which views mankind as constantly progressing toward an end to be achieved by human reason without the help of revelation.

This change from a theology to a philosophy of history has, since the days of the Enlightment, profoundly influenced the whole field of critico-historical theology, particularly in the ranks of liberal Protestantism. The New Testament has been "de-mythologized" and interpreted as simply profane history. The flight from dogma has been followed by a dogmatic faith in pure history as the integrating factor of reality. To apprehend the link and the distance between a theology and a philosophy of history, this study analyzes the change from the first to the second. Augustine is taken as the point of departure and Hegel as the term of this evolution.

Augustine's Theology of Salvation

The Christian interpretation of history views the future as the horizon of a final accomplishment and consummation. This view has in part been taken over in the modern, secularized concept of history, even though the end envisaged is now purely terrestrial. The pre-Christian concept of history is directly opposed to such a futuristic point of view. It interprets history as a circular movement, analogous to the cycles of birth and death in nature. This concept was still alive in Augustine's day, and his *City of God* is a refutation of it on theological, not theoretical or cosmological, grounds. For him, a circular movement of history precludes the Christian dogmas of revelation, salvation, and beatitude. Christian hope springs from the finality of salvation, whereas a fatalistic circular movement of history leads only to despair; it is in truth a vicious circle which returns always to itself, while the straight line of Christian history finds its symbolism in the Cross of Redemption.

The *City of God* is not a philosophy of history but a dogmatic exposition of the Christian faith against the background of universal history. Only secondarily does this demonstration of the Christian truth of salvation have reference to profane history and that in so far as history has its inner meaning because of its providential relation to salvation.

Of itself, the City of God is a mystic community of believers and is not iden-

tified with the visible Church. The authentic history of the City of God is the succession of the faith through the course of worldly events. Abraham, Moses, and Christ bear witness to an historical progress, but the time between the first and second comings of Christ is simply the "last age" and not a period of progressive stages that form a Christian history. As regards faith in Christ, Christianity has no history. The task of the Church is not to prepare an ever progressing Christian world, but to announce the truth of Christ, which is ever the same. For the rest, Augustine abstains from all apocalyptic or chiliastic speculation.

The relationship between the City of God and the City of the World lies in the fact that Christian existence is a pilgrimage through time. Consequently, Augustine, himself a product of Roman culture, rejects the contemporary view that the Roman empire is necessarily linked to Christianity. The Roman empire is valuable in so far as it preserves the peace and thereby facilitates the spread of the Gospel. Empires in themselves are neither good nor evil; they have original sin as their source, and their relative value stems from the measure of justice they achieve.

Augustine's lack of interest in profane history is reflected in the fact that only four of twenty-two books of the *City of God* are at all concerned with it. Profane history finds its meaning only with respect to the order of salvation. God's providential plan guides all men to their final end—this is universal history. But man fell from grace, and actual history became a history of conflict between the divine and human wills. All the enigmas of history are rooted in this duality of volition.

The revolt and fall of the first man gave birth to the possibility of a distinct human history. In an allegorical sense, Cain's fratricide represents the beginning of the City of the World whereas Abel is the symbol of the City of God. Cain is the founder of terrestrial empires; Abel is neither citizen or inhabitant but a traveler through time, striving like Bunyan's pilgrim to a supraterrestrial end. The descendants of Abel must live in the City of Cain, but they must not be of it. Theirs is the life of faith against the unbelief of the worldly city. Thus history, viewed in its totality, is a constant conflict between faith and unbelief.

The Augustinian theology of history does not seek to justify God in history, unless one understands by that the fragmentary reflections of the work of salvation in the world's history. History is cut off from God because man has separated himself from God. Still, Divine Providence is at work in human projects though man is incapable of comprehending perfectly the part played by God in temporal events.

Modern philosophers and theologians have criticized Augustine's view of world history as being the weakest part of his work because it pays no attention to the causal connections of history. But this lack of interest in coordinating the visible facts of history with the hidden facts of salvation is precisely that which characterizes Augustine's study and differentiates it from the more precise attempts of Bossuet and Hegel to justify God in the history of men. These last prove too much in their deductions from empirical events, chiefly because the providence of God in human affairs defies systematic explanation. Augustine may seem to belittle the role of history in interpreting Providence; actually this is only the obverse of his high regard for the unconditioned freedom of the will of God in history.

Hegel's Philosophy of History

Hegel in his *Introduction to the Philosophy of History* describes the history of the world in a panoramic view that gives him his point of departure. This view gives one the impression of a continuous and universal transformation. Peoples, states, individuals rise and fall. Even the highest endeavors of man fall into nothingness. But, paradoxically, out of each death there is a transformation into new life, a transformation which indicates the uninterrupted succession of earthly things.

Behind this history of change, Hegel places human passion and self-interest as the principles of all man's action and suffering. History realizes itself without regard to the laws of right and morality. In the failures of human af-

fairs Hegel sees a blind destiny and a revolt of the spirit against good. Why this should be is the question that Hegel sought to answer. He thought that the solution lay in secularizing Christian faith in Providence and in placing the fact of salvation in a purely terrestrial, historical perspective.

Hegel's solution to his problem is his theory of transformation, a solution that is both Western and Christian in its origins: Western because it opposes the Oriental concept of a continuous cycle of change, Christian because it flows from the Christian expectation of the Kingdom of God. Hegel himself refers to his concept of transformation to ever higher forms of life as "the establishment of the Kingdom of God." This idea of progress in history has as its principle a belief in the existence of an Absolute Reason which directs the course of universal history according to a pattern which human reason can detect. Since this finalistic guidance of the world by Reason is the Kingdom of God, faith and reason are identified by Hegel.

Despite this identification, human reason has failed to understand the divine plan because man has tended to center his religious faith (reason) on particulars. Universal history is not concerned with the needs of individual persons, peoples, or states. Its sphere is the totality of the world's history. The philosopher of history, using the "eyes of reason," can grasp the plan of Providence in its general outline; he can discover that its rationality lies in a progressive realization of liberty. In this sense, Hegel's philosophy of history is a species of theodicy, a justification of God in nature through universal history.

To reconcile the apparent irrationality of history with its hidden rationality, Hegel makes use of the "Ruse of Reason," the key concept of his philosophical theodicy. Reason knows better than men what they should will. Although men do not realize its intent, the "Ruse of Reason" attains its ends in the passions and intentions of individual men. Man acting historically is merely the agent of the universal Spirit of history which moves him. Thus it is of the essence of history that the results of historical actions should always be other than those consciously willed by men. Caesar and Napoleon little knew that they were in the service of the history of the West. In blindly striving for their own ends, they were really moved by an intrinsic necessity that dominated them. The "Ruse of Reason," therefore, is the power, philisophically understood, of Divine Providence. As irresistible as the will of God or the *Fatum* of the ancients, this universal Spirit achieves its ends though the individual may not perceive its workings or may even attempt to oppose it.

That the Christian religion is the true and absolute religion is a fundamental presupposition for Hegel. Christianity is an event at the very center of history, from which all that went before or will come after receives its intelligibility. It supports the teleological evolution of history and a systematic and rational history of the world. The ancient world had to seek through divination for its knowlege of an extrinsic Fate. Christianity places man in an intrinsic and personal relationship with God, precisely because Christ is both man and spirit. Thus the Christian can discover the true law of historical movement through his union with the divine will. Hegel is the last of the philosophers of history to appeal to the Christian tradition and, consequently, the last to possess a universal principle and a last end.

By contrast, mere comparative histories fail completely because they lack a principle of unity and intelligible organization. The fact of salvation was Augustine's principle; for Hegel it was the fact of Spirit. Later thought lost the idea of belief in a rational progress and completed the secularization of Christian eschatology, but in losing its theological presuppositions it also lost its rational foundations.

The essential differences between the thought of Augustine and that of Hegel lies in the relationship of Christianity to the world. Hegel viewed Christianity, not as a faith, but as a historico-worldly religion. Christianity is secularized and becomes merely the realization of Spirit in history.

Hegel himself was not conscious of the profound ambiguity of his attempt to destroy the fact of salvation and its

place in history and to transform the eyes of faith into those of reason. He believed that he was a "priest of the Absolute" and as such capable of knowing the plan of universal history and of justifying the way of the Spirit in the events of history.

In his interpretation of history, Hegel erred conspicuously in his view that history centered in the Christian West. He did not foresee the rise of Russia and America. But more important than the material insufficiency of his historical fresco is the intrinsic impossibility of his principle that the Christian religion attains its reality in the history of the world. Christianity demands faith in Christ, and faith cannot become understanding without ceasing to be faith. Hegel simply attempted the impossible when he strove to transform the assurance of faith into rational evidence.

The Scriptures and the Fathers of the Church have no such view of a completely intelligible world. On the contrary, they point to the fundamental discord between the history of the world and the fact of salvation. Hegel, because of his basic tendency to seek mediation and reconciliation, has so completely misunderstood this radical opposition that he has dared to reduce the two terms to unity. Hegelian history, in changing the will of God into the Spirit of the world, results in a product that is neither holy nor profane, but both at the same time.

Feuerbach, recognizing this ambiguity, has said that Hegel identifies "the negation of Christianity and Christianity itself . . . faith and unbelief, theology and philosophy, reason and atheism . . ." Marx and Kierkegaard developed the two contraries of Hegelianism: Marx by making everything hinge on the terrestrial character of history, Kierkegaard by passing over all historical speculation in favor of the message of Christ.

The cause for the ambiguity of the Hegelian philosophy of history lies in its laicizing of Christian principles which, in their origins, are not of this world. The duality of an origin which is not secular and a term that is secular contains a concealed dialectic of history, a law which guides events to results not intended by human agents.

It is the message of salvation that has opened men's eyes to the future as a horizon of fulfillment, which has given meaning to historical existence. The modern world has appropriated the idea of an end that gives meaning to history at the same time that it has become a stranger to the faith which is the foundation of this idea. The modern concept of history is neither Christian nor pagan but an unstable compound of faith and rational knowledge. As a result of this secularization of the Christian view, the world today no longer has even the religious motives of the pagan world.

Our modern "Christian" world appears in a double light: in its origins Christian, it is orientated toward a meaningful term; but in the ways and means to this term it is completely laicized. As a result, the entire history of the West is, in a certain measure, at once Christian and non-Christian. The Christian era has became worldly, and the laicized world has remained Christian in the process of laicization.

Recent history has seen man, urged on by the ideal of progress, effect tremendous changes throughout the world. Yet this very ideal of material progress, of bettering the world, is nothing more than a secularized form of the original belief in the Kingdom of God in which man would become perfect like his Creator.

This paradox is a striking example of the unpredictable results of history, results which yet seem to follow a definite course. Modern unilinear theories of progress and evolution cannot grasp the significance of historical events because they know only the will of man. Theology of history, because it considers both divine and human wills, has best understood the multidimensional advance of the world's happenings. For, as Bossuet said: "God alone knows how to fit all things to His will. That is why everything is surprising if we regard only particular causes, and yet everything moves forward with governed sequence."

THE OLD TESTAMENT

Law of Vengeance

HERMANN STIEGLECKER

Many readers of the Old Testament have been struck by the prominence of cruelty and vengeance in the scriptural account. Dr. Stieglecker, a professor in the Seminary of St. Florian, near Münich, tries to explain this element of cruelty in a way that will make it reasonable to moderns of supposedly more tender sensitivities. One of the points that receives rather lengthy treatment in this article is the notion of communal guilt, a concept that is prominent in modern thought. This digest is from Theologisch-praktische Quartalschrift, *XCIX (1951), pp. 103-118, 210-225.*

In the Old Dispensation we frequently encounter a concept of justice which at first glance may appear quite strange, but which recalls interpretations of the law reflected in our own times. It is the idea of collective responsibility, collective guilt and punishment, collective merits and collective reward. In the Semitic and especially the Israelite view the tribe or the nation forms such a compact, organized unit that the whole stands charged with the trespass of one person, and the individual is morally accountable for the transgression of the whole.

If collectivism was more in evidence in Israel than in other nations, one reason surely was that God had made a covenant with His people as a whole and bound the people as a whole to fidelity to the contract. Yet, it would not be correct to maintain that there was in Israel only a collective responsibility. Abraham, for instance, considered it just that innocent individuals should not be punished with the guilty community (Gen. 18:23). And while Exodus 20:5ff. has "I am the Lord thy God, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, unto the third and fourth generation," this is balanced by Deuteronomy 24:16, which makes personal responsibility the rule of conduct for criminal procedure and avoids tribal responsibility with all possible precision: "The fathers shall not be put to death for the children, nor the children for the fathers, but everyone shall die for his own sin."

The Case of Achan

Collectivism of guilt and punishment stands out clearly in the story of Achan. Achan had seized some forbidden plunder—and of him alone is this reported. Yet the scriptural account begins: The *Israelites* seized forbidden plunder (Jos. 7:1). The reason for this guilt then follows: "For Achan, a man of Juda . . . took some of the plunder for himself, and God was angry with the people of Israel." Thus, by the deed of one man all Israel stands guilty.

The consequence appeared full soon. Some 3,000 men sent out to subdue the town of Hai were put to flight and fell as casualties. God answered Josue's question about the cause of the defeat: "The Israelites have sinned . . . Some plunder has been hidden away." There is the cause: the deed of one has been laid upon all. Collective responsibility!

Basis for Collectivism

Just as God incorporated into His Law of Mount Sinai the prevalent concept of marriage, despite its imperfections, so He included in His Law the primitive concept of justice. Such a procedure on God's part is not without reasons that make it understandable.

1. It would have been very poor pedagogy radically to disturb this concept of justice or to ignore it entirely. Collectivism was by no means a stray

block in the structure of these men's ideas; rather, it was connected closely with their notions of community, clan, and people. With the elimination of moral collectivism, a change would necessarily have taken place in their concept of society. Change and innovations which do not take into account a society's organic structure only too readily carry with them the danger of shattering the moral foundation of that society, and so cause more harm than good.

2. As the notion of collectivism was already present and could not be displaced without consequent disadvantages, God made use of it as a means of education. It was suited to lead the individual and society to consider the observance of the divine precepts a matter in which every individual and all society engages and to look upon every trespasser as a menace. Such an attitude was bound to give a powerful stimulus to moral purpose and behavior—a stimulus which was especially desirable among a people still far from doing justice to the demands of morality.

3. Yet another reason lay in the great reality and truth underlying this collectivism. Picture the life of a nomadic tribe. It was obliged to be always on its guard against sudden attacks by hostile or robber tribes. One individual could bring catastrophe on his whole clan if in a time of danger he should, through an imprudent act, betray the camp of his tribe. On the other hand, the individual had to pay the penalty if the tribe as a whole made a fatal move.

In our modern states similar interrelationships are obscured by their great size; a searching study is necessary if these relationships are to be exactly determined. But in a tribal society the stage of events is smaller.

The interdependence of the deeds and the fate of individuals and of the group are clearly preceptible. Hence there springs up a feeling of closest solidarity. A single will, love, and hate seems to rule.

Community of Mind

These collective sentiments were a reality which gave a foundation for collective criminal procedures. In the case of Achan we notice that all were involved because all, no doubt, shared in Achan's wicked desires, although they had not acted on them.

In a society malefactors grow in number as the morality of the community sinks lower, that is, as the evildoer perceives his own wicked sentiments to be more in accord with the sentiments of the group. This community of mind furnishes him the audacity to perpetrate his wicked deeds.

Thus collective responsibility in the Old Testament finds a justification in the mutual responsibility that exists generally between the individual and society. If men have often administered that law unfeelingly, mechanically, or cruelly, the same fate has been shared by many another judicial process, just in itself, which has been used or misused to bring men to death. In very few cases are we able to ascertain the threads linking individuals to society and resulting in moral or immoral behavior. If mankind were in a position to understand how guilt of the individual is related to that of the group, it would see catastrophes, such as recent wars, with entirely different eyes.

Psalms of Malediction

The so-called psalms of malediction are often alleged as examples of the ruthlessness apparent throughout the Old Testament. The men of that age saw in the injustice worked against them an insult to God, for God had forbidden every injustice. Such a deed, therefore, was an assault upon His sovereign law and could be expiated only through the punishment of the criminal. If, therefore, the persecuted called down misfortune upon his enemy, this was, from the viewpoint of the curser, a prayer for the manifestation of God's chastising justice, which could not remain in abeyance because, if He allowed injustice to go unpunished, God would likewise be unjust.

This punishment must appear swiftly, like a thunderbolt, in order that God's punitive justice might be more impressive; otherwise many men would have reason to doubt the power and justice of God. The cry for speedy punishment can also be explained by the fact that faith in eternal retribution had scarcely any meaning in the minds of

these men. Consequently, there remained opportunity only in this life for the reign of God's punitive justice; hereafter, in the gloomy next life, there awaited all, both good and bad, the same unenviable lot.

Moreover, the cursers called down a very severe punishment; they had before their eyes a God who did not reveal His divine essence primarily in His love, but in His harsh, inexorable justice. A God who allowed Himself to appear tender and merciful in cases where His commands were so heinously violated would have seemed to these men no God at all.

Vendetta for Bloodshed

Men of today are only too easily disposed to see in the vendetta merely the devilish work of base passion which falls in unmitigated, brutal fury upon the murderer. But the fact is that the vendetta is based fundamentally upon a profound truth: murder must be punished and expiated. In the oldest ages of mankind, when the State had not yet assumed the full protection of rights, the vendetta was a completely obvious method of punishing a murderer.

The form the law took in Israel is clearly expressed in Genesis 9:6: "Whoever shall shed a man's blood, his blood shall be shed." Especially noteworthy here is the reasoning process behind such a law: "For man was made to the image of God." But in murder, man violates this image of God. Therefore, "his blood shall be shed." Hardly any idea could be introduced more suitable to make a people shrink from murder and to make its bloody expiation a sacred duty. How sacred the Old Testament considered this bloody expiation is apparent from the fact that it was forbidden to take blood money for a murder. This eliminated all bargaining and made it impossible for the powerful to avoid the merited severity of the law when the poor man could not likewise escape it.

Moses found the vendetta already in force among his people; its removal would have been regarded a monstrous outrage. The law of Mt. Sinai sought at least to mitigate the severities of the vendetta. In primitive times man made no distinction between intentional and unintentional killing, between murder and manslaughter. But according to the Mosaic Law, the murderer was handed over to the avenger who had the religious duty to kill him; in the case of accidental killing the culprit could seek protection in one of the designated cities of asylum.

The Law of Retaliation

The law of vendetta was a special instance of the so-called *talio,* the law of retaliation, whose Old Covenant formula reads: "Life for a life, eye for an eye, tooth for a tooth, etc." (Exodus 21:23 ff). This was surely the oldest, because the most readily available, punishment for transgression against the life and limb of one's neighbor. The circumstance that Numbers 35:31 forbids the acceptance of blood money for murder allows the conjecture that in Israel this basic precept was not carried out to the letter in all cases.

Very important for the full understanding of the law "eye for an eye" is the fact that it not only determined the punishment but also safeguarded the evildoer against the excesses of the avenger. The Codex of Hamurabbi knows not only the formula: "Eye for an eye, tooth for a tooth," and so forth, but also: "Son for son, daughter for daughter." The Mosaic Law as such did not know these cruder Bablyonian and Assyrian forms of retaliation, acutally one of the blackest features of heathendom.

David and Joab

When David felt his end was near, he gave his son Solomon the commission to kill Joab. In modern polemical writings against the Old Testament, David has been severely censured for this command. These writers point to Joab's loyalty to David. To this talented general David owed nearly all his military success; to him was due the saving of the dynasty. It is, therefore, the blackest treachery that David should deliver this prominent man to the executioner.

The dying David's sentence against Joab is set forth in I Kings 2:5 ff.: "Thou knowest also (said David to Solomon) what Joab the son of Sarvia hath done to me, what he did to the two captains of the army of Israel, to Abner the son of Ner, and to Amasa the son

of Jether, whom he slew . . . Do therefore according to thy wisdom, and let not his hoary head go down to hell in peace."

In the eyes of David the twofold murder by Joab was a monstrous crime. Influenced, no doubt, by personal reasons he had murdered both generals, even though peace had already been concluded with them. The king felt himself burdened through these crimes because he, as king, was responsible for the exact observance of the treaty stipulations, and to this belonged assuring the lives of both generals.

The command of David to kill Joab could be considered a vendetta, yet vendetta in its customary sense does not apply here. Rather the king considered it his duty to punish the guilty when for some reason or other the inflicting of punishment by the relatives was not carried out. To this there is added the religious conviction: innocent blood which has not been expiated brings bad fortune upon the whole people. For this reason also David thought it his duty to punish the murderer.

During long years David carried with him the depressing consciousness that through his cowardice blood lay upon the land, but shortly before his death he took the necessary steps against Joab. When later his dynasty or his people should be visited with some misfortune, then no one would be able to say that David was to blame for not having expiated the guilt of Joab.

So David surely, and so his contemporaries, understood the command to Solomon. That the king did not, for very personal reasons—the ambition of Joab, his effrontery, the fear that he might oppose Solomon—find it difficult to issue this death warrant may be very true and in no way redounds to the king's praise; still it remains that David's death warrant for Joab was not only entirely in accord with the idea of justice then prevalent, but was also required of him.

Revenge of the Gabaonites

In II Kings 21 we read: "There was a famine in the days of David for three years successively: and David consulted the oracle of the Lord. And the Lord said: it is for Saul, and his bloody house, because he slew the Gabaonites." At the time of the conquest these Gabaonites had tricked Josue into making a promise under oath to let them live, although as Canaanites they were subject to death. Despite this oath, King Saul sought to exterminate them.

David had a delegation of the surviving Gabaonites brought to him and asked: "What shall I do for you? And what shall be the atonement for you?" Expiation must be accomplished, that fact the king and people know. God allows them to make the satisfaction according to their concept of justice: The Gabaonites said: "The man that crushed us and oppressed us unjustly, we must destroy in such a manner that there be not so much as one left of his stock in all the coasts of Israel. Let seven men of his children be delivered unto us, that we may crucify them unto the Lord in Gabaa." They wished to exact revenge from those who were nearest to the actually guilty party. These people of the clan of Saul had already approved the machinations of Saul against the dynasty of David; likewise, then, of Saul's bloody deeds against the Gabaonites.

Many a critic thinks that God's demand for the expiation of the murder of the Gabaonites was but a fabrication of David. But it is hardly credible that David fabricated a declaration of God and under the aegis of this invented word of God perpetrated a sevenfold murder. For us who consider the passage inspired, such a fraud is excluded by the very wording of the text.

The corpses of the seven remained unburied on the mountaintop. The account of what followed should be mentioned here, since it is especially fitted to give us an insight into the intimate spiritual workings of these men of the distant past. The account reads: "Then Respha (the mother of two of the executed) took haircloth, and spread it under her upon the rock from the beginning of the harvest till water dropped upon them out of heaven, and suffered neither birds to tear them by day, nor beasts by night."

This case shows what remarkable moral strength, what heroism these people were capable of displaying when they felt obliged to protect ancient, inviolable

rights—these people who appear to us to be harsh, untamed, and blood-thirsty. It cautions us, as well, against seeing in the Old Testament only the severity and the cruelty and basing thereon our condemnation; against overlooking, on account of events of little appeal, the great ideas that lie beneath them.

The moving account of the revenge of the Gabaonites and of the heroic woman Respha finds a conciliatory ending. David, deeply affected by the great deed of Respha, allows the executed to be placed, together with the remains of Saul and Jonathan, in the family sepulchre of Cis, the father of Saul. Thus the expiation is accomplished, and this somber scriptural selection ends on a note of hope: "Henceforth God again looked favorably upon the land."

MORALITY OF BOXING

During the years 1950 and 1951, boxing and the moral problems related to it went beyond the columns of the sports pages and found its way into the pages of journals as disparate as *Business Week, The Journal of the American Medical Association,* and *The American Ecclesiastical Review.*

The majority opinion was that prizefighting as we have it today is not morally justified. The most serious of the many charges against the sport was its lethal aspect. Too many deaths result from boxing. Fr. Francis Connell, C.SS.R., was somewhat cautious in his charges that boxing entails, at the very least, probable injuries—assuming the "knockout" as the usual boxing objective. More than one moralist castigated professional boxing for its savage brutality; to Fr. Gerald Kelly, S.J., this seemed the strongest argument against the sport. Fr. Eugene Hillman, C.S.Sp., argued that recurrent head blows received in the ring involve the very real danger of permanent brain injury. Recent medical investigations give added weight to this argument. R. Schuessler sides with those who look to the brutal aspects of the sport, but he too emphasizes the damage to the brain. As evidence he cites medical and statistical finding to the effect that an estimated one-half of the 2,500 professional fighters are punch-drunk to some degree.

The minority opinion was not without its defenders. Dr. Thomas A. Gonzales, M.D., showed that in thirty-two years of boxing competition there have been proportionately fewer deaths in the ring than in baseball or football. However, he touches only lightly on the subject of non-fatal injuries for which he gives no statistics. Fr. Martin Gounley, C.SS.R., saw the ratio of grave injuries considerably reduced simply by the application of state boxing regulations.

Francis J. Connell, C.SS.R., *American Ecclesiastical Review*, CXXII (1950), p. 75.

Thomas A. Gonzales, M.D., "Fatal Injuries in Competitive Sports," *The Journal of the American Medical Association,* CXLVI (1951), 1506-1510.

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THE *Divine Office* AS A METHOD OF PRAYER

BEDE GRIFFITHS, O. S. B.

This digest should appeal to priests and to all others who say the Divine Office daily, for it points to a way of making the Office a more personal prayer. Dom Griffiths' original article appeared in Life of the Spirit, *VI (1951), pp. 77-85.*

There is no doubt that for a great many priests and religious, if not the majority of them, the Divine Office is not a congenial method of prayer. It is a duty to be performed, which has its own special grace and virtue, but it is not generally felt as a personal method of prayer and approach to God. Several reasons can be found for this attitude. It is partly that a different method of prayer, based ultimately on the Exercises of St. Ignatius, has come to be a normal training in prayer; partly also that the Divine Office has come to seem rather remote from modern ways of thought and feeling.

The problem of making the Divine Office a living, personal act of prayer certainly cannot be solved by study. One of the difficulties of the Divine Office is that it is so complex; and an analytical study tends to increase its complexity. It seems to us that there is need for an entirely different approach to it, an approach which will tend to reduce it to a more and more complete simplicity. Prayer, as we know, is the simple act of "raising the mind and heart to God." All the words which we use are only intended to awaken the simple act of the intellect and will by which we are united to God.

The first object of every method of prayer must therefore be to bring about a state of recollection. The regular recitation of the Psalms, whether to oneself or in choir, is aptly suited to this end by reason of their rhythm, which after a short time will be found to produce a state of recollection quite naturally. It is not a matter of attending studiously to the meaning of the words, but rather of withdrawing the mind from distractions as they arise and letting the rhythm of the words gradually assert its influence. At first it may be sufficient to attend to one or two words which constantly recur, like "dominus" and "deus." If every time these words occur in the psalmody, one were to make an act of "raising the heart and mind to God," this would be in itself a perfect prayer.

But we must be careful not to think of this act of attention to God as any kind of "thinking about" God. We cannot assert too strongly that prayer is not essentially discursive thought. It is rather a withdrawal of the mind from other considerations, an act of detachment, by which the mind is brought to rest in the presence of God. It cannot be forced; but if we seek it consistently, it will be found to arise gradually. When this prayer in the presence of God is attained, the meaning of the Psalms will begin to impress itself on us. This will not result from our own efforts, but rather from the action of grace, or more precisely, from the gifts of the Holy Spirit. These gifts create in us those habits of the fear of God, of piety and fortitude, of counsel and knowledge, of understanding and wisdom, which the Psalms invite us to exercise. Thus the function of the Psalms is to dispose us to receive light and grace from above. If we approach the Divine Office in this way, we shall see that it is a sacrament in the original meaning of that word. The Psalms and the rest of the sacred liturgy are not simply human words; they are the

means by which the mystery of the Word is revealed to us. If, then, we approach the Divine Office as a sacrament, through which we are to be brought into the presence of God, we shall find that God gradually reveals Himself to us.

This revelation may be conveniently considered in three parts: first the revelation of the mystery of God, then that of the mystery of Christ, and finally that of the mystery of the Church. To begin with the first—if we start, as has been suggested, simply with the words "dominus" and "deus" and try to allow them to exercise all their power over us, we shall find that other words begin to group themselves round them, revealing the personal relationship in which God stands to us. And so an expression of faith, hope, and love is found at the beginning of Psalm 17: "I will love Thee, O Lord, my strength. The Lord is my firmament, my refuge, and my deliverer. My God is my helper and in Him will I put my trust." Here we have an expression which takes us into the very heart of the divine mystery, and gives us inexhaustible food for prayer. It is on passages such as this that we need to sustain our prayer till they color the whole of our outlook.

This is only an isolated instance of the themes which run throughout the Psalms like a counterpoint; and we have to learn to recognize them as they appear, until we grasp the unity of the whole structure of the psalmody. For we must never lose sight of the fact that the Psalms and the whole of the Divine Office form a single whole; they are all elements in an organic structure. We do not want to analyze particular elements, but rather acquire a "sense of the whole." The Divine Office has been constructed so as to bring out continually the underlying unity of the Scriptures, to relate the Old Testament to the New; and where the relationship is obscure, to bring in the commentaries of the Fathers to make it clear.

This brings us to the second "mystery" which is revealed in the Divine Office, the mystery of Christ; for it is in Christ the Word that the whole of the Scriptures and the whole of the Divine Office is centered. But we must beware of forming a too human picture of Christ. We have to accustom ourselves to the Old Testament approach to Christ, which is also that of the Apostles and Fathers of the Church. Close recollection while reading will disclose Christ as Messiah: King (Ps. 2), Suffering Servant (Ps. 13), Priest (Ps. 109). This archetypal figure of the King who is also a Priest, and who still more mysteriously offers himself as Victim, underlies the whole of the Psalter and indeed of the Old Testament. It is as the representative of mankind before God that Christ is presented to us in the Psalter. Thus the shadow of the New Testament is seen to be cast in the Old. Adam, Abel, Noe, Isaac, Jacob, Joseph, Israel in bondage—all these are types of Christ. This is the "mystery" of Christ, the mystery of the redemption of the world wrought by suffering and sacrifice and death, the victory of the Cross.

Reflection on the mystery of Christ is not enough; we ought to participate and share in its saving power. Since Christ speaks as the representative of mankind, and since each of us is called to share in the priesthood and kingship and sufferings of Christ, it is fitting that we should make the Psalms our own prayer. It may, in fact, be said that our growth in prayer can be measured by the extent to which we are able to enter into the Psalms and make their thought our own.

We come now to the third great "mystery" enshrined in the Psalms, the mystery of the Church. Each of us is not only an individual member of the Body of Christ, sharing uniquely in the mystery of Christ and through Him drawing near as an individual person to God. We are also members of a society, of a people which has its history and its law, which constitutes a city and a kingdom. The Old Testament gives us the history of this earthly city or Kingdom of God and its conflicts with its neighboring peoples, and the Psalms reflect both the history and the morality of the Old Testament. But in the New Testament we are able to identify the Israel of the Old Testament with what St. Paul calls the "Israel of God," that is, with the

Church. But it is the Church regarded not merely as an earthly, visible institution, but as the society of redeemed mankind, embracing all peoples and all history, and revealed in its true nature only when it is seen "coming down out of heaven from God," as St. John sees it in the Apocalypse. This gradual transfiguration of the visible material order of the Old Testament into the eternal invisible order in which it finds its true meaning in the New Testament is the "mystery" which underlies all the Scriptures.

The Holy Spirit not only enlightens our minds to understand Scripture, but He is the Spirit by which the Scriptures are inspired, by Whom the Revelation is unfolded. Now this revelation is itself an event; it is contained in a history which is unfolded through the course of time, and we ourselves are called to participate in that event and to be transformed in our inmost being by its power. We have to share as members of the Church in the history of Israel, just as we have to share as members of Christ in His life and death and Resurrection, in His Ascension and His triumph over the powers of this world. We have to learn to see not only the Church and the liturgy, but the whole of this visible universe and the whole history of mankind as a great sacrament in which God is being revealed.

But this revelation is not static but dynamic. The visible creation is at all times in a state of transformation by which it is passing into the invisible order of the new creation. In the same way human history in its temporal process is forever being transfigured by the power of God into the eternal order of the kingdom of heaven. The sphere of this action is the Church, and the power of the transfiguration is the Holy Spirit, and it is through the action of the Mass and the liturgy of the Church that we ourselves enter upon this process of transformation. By the visible signs of the Sacraments and the intelligible signs of Scripture and Tradition, the eternal, invisible, unchanging Being of God is made known to us through these temporal and visible signs, which at the same time reveal God and communicate Him to us. We need these signs and we must always make use of them because they are the means ordained by God for our salvation. But at the same time we must never forget that they are signs, that they point to something beyond themselves. The words, images, and thoughts of the Divine Office lead us to the contemplation of the divine mystery.

If we may now attempt to sum up the characteristics of the Divine Office as a method of prayer, we may say that it is three-fold. In the first place it is *symbolic.* It is not, as we have insisted, primarily a method of discursive thought or of theological reflection. It has to be approached as we approach a poem. Its meaning has to be grasped not by a process of rational analysis but by that knowledge known by "sympathy." The meaning has to be grasped as a whole and from within, so that the symbols of which it is composed exercise their power over us. But the symbols of the liturgy are not merely natural symbols; they are supernatural signs, akin to the Sacraments themselves, which produce a supernatural effect in us and communicate the divine mystery, which they contain, to our souls. In this sense the Divine Office may be called *sacramental.* It is a system of signs and symbols which manifest the Word of God to us and communicate the grace of the Spirit. If we submit ourselves to its influence and let its special grace act upon us, we ourselves are transformed by its power and enter into the mystery of Christ and the Church. Finally, the Divine Office is *communal* in the full sense of that word. It is a prayer which embraces all mankind and reveals the meaning of all history. Through it we enter into that order of grace, which is the Kingdom or City of God, and we take our places as members of a whole, of a society, which extends through time and space but which finds its fulfillment in an order of being beyond time and space, beyond all words and thoughts, in the "new creation" in which God Himself dwells. Through the Divine Office we enter into that order of grace which comprises the mystery of God, of His Christ, and of His Church.

IMMANENCE *and* TRANSCENDENCE *of Grace*

J. SIMON, O. M. I.

Many modern thinkers outside the Church, obsessed with the idea of man's independence, reject the concept of a supernatural order of grace as an intereference with man's liberty. This rejection of grace can be simply stated as a refusal to accept a "foreign intruder" on man's freedom, or it can take the more subtle form of identifying grace with man's nature. The present article shows that both of these positions rest on a misunderstanding of the true nature of grace—the first loses sight of the true immanence of grace, the second of grace's transcendence. Father Simon is professor of dogmatic theology at the abbey of Solignac in Canada. The original article appeared in the Revue de l'Université d'Ottawa, *XXI (1951), pp. 344-369.*

The mutual relations of the natural and the supernatural present a problem which has become very prominent in our day. At the Conference of Catholic Intellectuals, held in Paris during the week of May 7-14, 1950, Archbishop Feltin of Paris remarked that there are few difficulties which are so vital and so imperiously demand solution. It is not a new or merely speculative problem. It is one that preoccupied the classic commentators of St. Thomas; it was the center of vigorous dispute at the time of the Jansenists; and its solution became a vital issue during the Modernist crisis. Recent debates on the subject have caused a return to the Thomistic sources and resulted in a veritable maelstrom of discussion.

The recent encyclical *Humani Generis* numbers among the dangerous errors of our time a tendency to deny or question the gratuity of the supernatural order. It is necessary, therefore, to avoid both dangerous immanentism and an unacceptable extrinsicism in any fruitful discussion of the question.

In many circles objections are raised against the Catholic position, objections which reveal a misunderstanding of the Church's real doctrine. How can we admit a union with human nature, complete in itself, of a supernature which can only crush and, seemingly, annihilate it? No harmonious relation seems possible. One cannot but conceive the supernatural as a fearful gift, forced upon man by an overpowering kindness, whether he wishes it or not, a gift which must overwhelm in him all that is really his. Endowed with a perfect nature, we have not the option of freely using it, but must accept from without a principle of life that is beyond and above us, which must result in an impoverishment, a mangling, even a denial of our true selves. This is the so-called extrinsicism which is so vehemently objected against the supernatural today. It is an objection which clamors for answer, since its audience is large and growing from day to day.

Sound theological thought has never attempted to exalt the supernatural at the expense of the natural. It has always maintained that for the full supernatural life the fullest realization of the natural was necessary, since the supernatural uses the natural as the engrafted slip uses the sap of the parent-stalk. Christianity, far from doing violence to the natural, insures its triumph and elevation to a level of operation which is more than human. No man was more truly human than Christ, and grace transforms us into living images of Him.

The Natural Desire for the Supernatural

In a discussion of the natural and the supernatural, we cannot choose a better guide than St. Thomas. A just appreciation of his thought will go far to dissipate misunderstandings and to set at rest the fears of those who are so acutely sensitive about the preservation of human dignity.

It is chiefly in the *Prima Secundae* that St. Thomas studies grace. It is there envisaged as a principle implanted in us by God and enabling us to reach our supernatural end.

Every being has an end which it is to attain by those means which God gives it. Man, as a spiritual being, is ordered to the knowledge and love of God. The main intent of the twenty-fourth and twenty-fifth chapters of the *Contra Gentiles* is to demonstrate that "the end of every intellectual substance, even of the lowest, is to know God." The same conclusion occurs in the second and third questions of the *Prima Secundae*. Our spiritual nature is made for universal being and universal goodness; consequently, it cannot be satisfied by a reality which is created and, therefore, limited. God, then, is man's basic need. With the whole force of his spiritual being, man strives toward the knowledge of God, for there is his end, there his happiness.

His very grandeur is the source of man's misery. Made to see the universe, to look upon the infinite, man cannot be completely satisfied by knowledge of the created world. Left to himself, he can attain only the most fragmentary knowledge of God. The divine essence is hidden from his view. It is dimly glimpsed through the medium of created things. Inapproachable, it is veiled in blinding clarity.

This natural inability to contemplate the inner nature of God is the source of a more or less explicitly sensed frustration. Our knowledge of the world only intensifies the longing to see its first cause. Throughout his works[1], St. Thomas returns again and again to this desire, which arises spontaneously from the normal exercise of our intelligence. Our knowledge of a thing, he argues, is as nothing unless we know its essence. But our desire to know the essence of the cause grows more urgent, if we know its effects. We are impelled to complement our knowledge that the cause exists with the knowledge of its essence, for no imperfect knowledge can perfectly satisfy the spiritual soul. The more we know, the more we wish to know.

The third question of the *Prima Secundae,* article eight, discusses this question of the natural desire to see God. Man cannot be said to possess perfect happiness unless his desires are satisfied. But so long as he seeks, he is not satisfied. The perfection of a potency can consist only in the full attainment of its object, and the object of the intellect is essence. The intellect, therefore, knowing the effects, will not rest unless it knows the essence of the cause[2].

We desire, then, not an incomplete or veiled apprehension of God, but a complete and satisfying possession, because we recognize it as our greatest good. There is, therefore, only one happiness, that which we attain in God Himself. It is after such happiness that man aspires, even though he can neither name nor express it.

But is such a desire doomed to endless frustration? Is it an appeal to emptiness, an eternal cry without answer? Surely not, if one correctly understands what nature is. It is unthinkable that a natural desire should be frustrated. It is upon this natural desire that St. Thomas bases his proof of the possibility of our elevation to the supernatural order.[3]

But how can this be? For in man there can be no true exigence for the supernatural. Any theory which implicates such an exigency destroys the very notion of the supernatural which must remain always and essentially a free gift of God. Moreover, the whole doctrine of the Church, proclaiming as it does that the supernatural can be in no way naturalized, is hostile to immanentism.

The thought of St. Thomas makes no attempt to reduce the supernatural to the level of the natural. For the natural desire in the Thomist sense is inefficacious. Man lacks the means necessary to realize it. "Although man has a natural

1 See especially *C. G.*, III, 50.

2 Cf. *S. T.* I, q. 8; *Compend. Theol.*, 104.
3 *C. G.*, III, 50; *S. T.*, I, q. 12.

inclination to his last end, he is not able to attain to it naturally, but by the help of grace alone. It is for this reason that his last end is transcendent."[4] Besides being inefficacious, this desire is conditional, dependent upon God's granting us the means necessary to fulfill it. Since it cannot be vain, a natural desire must be realizable *if* God in His goodness should grant us means to satisfy it. We await then the divine help, apart from which we should desire the impossible, to see Him as He is.

This is as much as unaided reason can tell us: there is no a priori repugnance to our intuitive knowledge of God. But it is revelation that informs us that God has made us partakers of His nature, that through His grace He has found a way to draw us into the intimacy of His own life, toward which, St. Thomas adds, we have a true though inefficacious aspiration.

In an order of pure nature, man's end would be one in harmony with his natural capabilities and exigencies. This end could have been no other than God, beheld not intuitively, but in the mirror of His creatures. There are, then two beatitudes possible for man, the natural and the supernatural, of which the supernatural alone is perfect.[5]

Granted the existence of a natural desire for the intuitive vision of God, does it follow that God is in any way held to destine us to such an end? Although St. Thomas has nowhere directly and explicitly posed the question, the whole tenor of his thought demands a negative response. St. Thomas admits the validity of the concept of natural beatitude. But a natural beatitude is meaningless if God is in any way constrained to destine intellectual creatures to a supernatural end. In addition, St. Thomas maintains that the natural desire to see God is compatible with a real happiness natural in every way. For in discussing the condition after death of unbaptized infants, he says, "they will not suffer because they lack the beatific vision; rather, they will enjoy their natural perfection."[6]

4. *Comm. in Boet. De Trin.*, q. 4, a. 4 ad 5.
5 *Quaest. Disp. De Virt.*, a. 10 ad 1; *S. T.*, I-II, q. 3, a. 2 ad 1; q. 3, a. 5; q. 4, aa. 5, 7.
6 *In II Sent.*, d. 33, q. 2, a. 2.

Obediential Potency

If one can speak with truth of a natural desire for the beatific vision, there must exist within human nature a capacity for the supernatural. Theologians call this capacity obediential potency. At bottom, it is nothing but the creature's complete submission, his absolute malleability in the hands of God transforming and elevating him to a new life.[7] Unlike that passive potency which can be actuated by a natural agent, obediential potency is not ordained to a determined act, neither is it the principle of any operation. For its actuation it looks to God alone, for it has no limits apart from His omnipotence. To understand the presence of this obediential potency in the human intellect, we must first understand something of that intelligence itself.

The object of the intellect is being. Being is adequately divided into the created and the uncreated. The divine essence contains the plenitude of being; the intelligence is the faculty by which being is known. There is not, therefore, a complete and abysmal disparity between the two.[8] As human, our intellect has as its proportioned object concepts drawn from sensible reality; but, as intelligence, it has the whole range of being as its adequate object. There is, consequently, no repugnance intrinsic to the intellect in its elevation to intuitive contemplation. The object of such contemplation exceeds its proportioned or specificative object, not, however, its adequate object.

The notion, then, of obediential potency is fundamental for a just understanding of our supernatural elevation. It safeguards the true immanence of the supernatural, for obediential potency is a natural aptitude, an aptitude identified with human nature itself—thus the objection of extrinsicism is deprived of validity. Nor can it be objected that the absolute transcendency, the gratuity of the supernatural is in any way compromised, since the actuation of the obediential potency must depend upon the free decree of divine goodness. Still it is within the structure of human intelligence itself that one finds the basic explanation of why such an act of divine goodness is possible, for, as Aquinas remarks, "because

7 *S. T.*, III, q. 11, a. 1.
8 *C. G.*, III, 54.

the intellect of man is capable of understanding the universal and perfect good and because his will is able to desire it, man is capable of perfect happiness."[9]

Grace the Perfection of Nature

There remains one objection to examine, one which causes much difficulty to moderns when they consider the doctrine of the supernatural. This obediential potency seems to be nothing but a lack of positive repugnance for the reception of the supernatural. How can the supernatural life be built upon a mere void? Where is the room for our own initiative? Grace appears as an artificial addition imposed upon man from without. How is it possible to safeguard the vitality of our supernatural activity?

The objection deserves a thorough consideration for it would ill befit the grandeur and nobility of man to reduce him to a purely passive role in the attainment of his end, through an activity that could in no true sense be called his. In a word, the problem is: can man be a real cause in the supernatural order?

St. Thomas answers briefly: Because the vision of God and the meritorious acts which lead to it are vital acts, it is necessary that human nature, which is the vital principle of all human operations, should be the basic, the radical cause of these acts, not a purely extrinsic and adventitious principle. Supernaturally meritorious acts, then, proceed from human nature, not as abandoned to its congenital state, but as intrinsically raised, as transformed and supernaturalized within its very core by grace. Nature is changed, not destroyed. The natural and the supernatural, far from being antipathetic, complement each other and unite without losing their distinction. The natural virtues are sublimated and produce acts at once human and divine. Our participation in the divine nature, our deification, does not destroy our natural being but enables us to transcend its limits.

The classic metaphor of grafting will help us to understand this elevation better. It is enough that only a few living cells should be implanted. The parent-stalk, which before produced only acrid, distasteful fruit, when it is enriched by the sap of the slip, produces sweet fruit. The tree itself causes the fruit as before, but causes it now as changed by the engrafted shoot. Still the shoot lives by the life of the tree. The life of each penetrates, becomes interior to the other.

Similarly, nature and grace produce a common action, an action which is totally the work of nature and totally the work of grace. As the soul is distinct from the body and yet is present in the whole body and in all the body's parts, so do the natural and the supernatural compenetrate without fusing.

Conclusion

We have seen, then, that the supernatural is not something violently intruded upon man's nature, crushing and annihilating it, but the marvelous and altogether gratuitous complement of a natural but inefficacious desire of human intelligence to know the essence of the first cause. Supernatural life is the actuation of a real and obediential potency within human nature. This is not to say that the supernatural is contained virtually in the natural, as though the natural were the material out of which the supernatural is fashioned (*materia ex qua*). Nevertheless, the subject of God's elevating action is the soul itself, which it raises to a participation of divine life, "ut ipsam essentiam animae in quoddam divinum esse elevet." Nature is the subject in which grace is caused (*materia in qua*). Grace is not *from us* but *in us*, at once immanent and transcendent, intrinsic and extrinsic.

9 *S. T.*, III, q. 5, a. 1.

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